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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF PERSUASIBILITY 
Overview 
Social psychologists have been studying the persuasion process for decades by 
dissecting persuasive situations into the basic components of the source, the message, 
the audience, the medium, and the effect (Lasswell, 1948), and by placing each of 
these components under the research microscope. Hundreds of studies have brought 
into sharper focus our understanding of how different sources, different messages, and 
different media affect the development and change of attitudes. 
Our understanding of one component, however, remains largely blurred. That 
component is the audience, and what remains out of focus is our understanding of 
individual differences in attitude formation and change. Relative to their research 
interest in the source and the content of the message, social psychologists have shown 
little interest in what makes individuals respond differently to a given message. This 
is unfortunate because as long as our understanding of the audience remains out of 
focus, social psychologists may never get a clear picture of attitudes and attitude 
change. 
One of the earliest attempts to integrate the many different components of 
persuasion was put forward Janis and Hovland (1959). Using Lasswell's (1948) 
framework, Janis and Hovland painted a model of persuasion in which changes in 
1 
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attitudes are affected by 1) communication stimuli (such as the characteristics of the 
communicator or the content of the message), 2) predispositional factors of the 
individual audience member (such as an entrenched attitude or a wavering personal-
ity), and 3) internal mediating processes (such as the listener's attention, comprehen-
sion and acceptance of the message). 
A major element of the Janis and Hovland (1959) model, and the focus of this 
paper, is the notion that some people, regardless of what is being argued, are 
consistently more open to persuasion than others. Janis and Hovland labeled this 
tendency to agree with most persuasive messages "unbounded persuasibility," and 
suggested that persuasibility is a stable personality characteristic that causes some 
people to be easily persuaded across a variety of situations, and others to remain 
highly resistant to most attempts at persuasion. In formulating the notion of 
persuasibility Janis, (1954) claimed that studies 
" ... apparently contradict the assumption that individuals exhibit completely 
unrelated degrees of susceptibility that are unique to each opinion topic or 
to each communication situation. Consequently, there is reason to suspect 
that some more or less general factors of persuasibility will be eventually 
isolated upon which accurate predictions can be made as to how different 
individuals will respond to various discrete communications on different 
topics" (p. 506). 
This quote points to two areas where our understanding of persuasibility is still 
cloudy. Janis (1954) envisioned that psychologists eventually would isolate a general 
trait of persuasibility, and then be able to predict who is open to persuasion and who 
is resistant to persuasion. Yet, decades later only a handful of researchers have tried 
to isolate a persuasibility trait, and only occasionally have they been able to make 
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accurate predictions about who will and who will not be persuaded by a variety of 
messages. Therefore, the current study will examine (a) the existence of an 
unbounded persuasibility trait, (b) whether individual differences in unbounded 
persuasibility can be predicted accurately from several social psychological measures, 
and (c) whether paper-and-pencil scales that were designed to measure unbounded 
persuasibility can accurately predict individual differences in persuasibility. 
Distinctions Among Different Types of Persuasibility 
In discussing how persuasibility might affect the persuasion process, Janis and 
Hovland (1959) made an important distinction between "bounded" and "unbounded" 
persuasibility factors. According to Janis and Hovland, bounded persuasibility factors 
are personality traits that leave a message recipient susceptible a limited range of 
persuasive messages. Unbounded factors, on the other hand, are personality factors 
that leave a recipient susceptible to an unlimited variety of messages. 
Bounded Persuasibility. Janis and Hovland (1959) proposed several 
subdivisions of bounded persuasibility. For instance, they speculate that some person-
ality types may be more persuaded on a particular topic than others. In line with this 
topic-bound factor, Cacioppo and Petty (1980) report that men are more persuaded 
than women on stereotypically feminine topics (namely, female fashions) while 
women are more persuaded than men on stereotypically masculine topics (namely, 
- football issues). Janis and Hovland also suggest that some personality types might be 
more influenced by a particular style of message, regardless of the topic. Recent 
4 
examples of such content-bound factors include studies showing that high self-
monitors are particularly susceptible to messages that stress "image" over "substance" 
(Snyder & DeBono, 1987), and other studies that find people low in "need for 
cognition" are unpersuaded by messages that require large amounts of mental 
processing (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). 
The notion that certain people may be susceptible to certain types of 
communication is not unique to Janis and Hovland's (1959) vision of bounded 
persuasibility. Another early attempt to link personality variables to a limited range 
of persuasive messages was put forth in the "functional theories" of attitude change 
(see Katz, 1960; Smith, Bruner & White, 1956). Common to all functional theories 
is the assumption that people maintain their attitudes because their attitudes fulfill 
some psychological needs. According to Katz, attitudes can serve four basic functions 
-- instrumental, ~go-defensive, value-expressive, and knowledge functions. Attitudes 
that serve the instrumental function are maintained because holding the attitude 
produces some external benefits. For instance, voters may support a liberal 
p~esidential candidate only because of the praise they can receive from like-minded 
friends. Attitudes that serve the ego-defensive function, on the other hand, exist 
because the outward expression of the attitude might protect a person from unpleasant 
inner-truths. For instance, other voters may support the same liberal candidate in 
order to repress inner fears that they lack compassion for other people. Value-
expressive attitudes are maintained in order to advertise personal values. Thus, a 
third block of voters may support the liberal candidate as a way of expressing their 
5 
personal ideologies. Finally, attitudes that serve the knowledge function are held in 
order to simplify a complex array of information into a single, efficient mental 
structure. Toward this end, some voters may support the same candidate after 
distilling everything they know about the candidate into a single supportive attitude. 
Although the functional theories have not generated much research (for a good 
example, see Snyder & DeBono, 1987), they have reminded researchers that a 
persuasive message will only be effective if its content is targeted toward the specific 
function being served by an attitude. Stated another way, a message that presents 
cogent, factual information may help change knowledge-based attitudes but would not 
change instrumental, ego-defensive, or value-expressive attitudes. An implication of 
this for persuasibility is that people will only be open to messages to the extent that 
the messages address the functional bases of their attitudes. 
Along with the functional theories, the more recent "Person x Situation 
interaction" approach (see Kahle, 1984) has been another direct extension of bounded 
persuasibility. According to this approach, a given personality variable might only 
affect persuasibility in a narrow range of communication situations. For instance, the 
finding that men are easily persuaded on fashion issues but are not easily persuaded 
on football issues is consistent with the Person X Situation interaction approach. 
Similarly, the finding that high authoritarians are more persuaded by high authority 
sources (Berkowitz & Lundy, 1957; Centers, Shomer, & Rodrigues, 1970; Johnson 
& Izzett, 1969) is also consistent with the predictions of both the Janis-Hovland model 
and the Person X Situation interaction model. 
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The Person X Situation interaction model has generated a closer look at the 
role of personality in persuasion. And, while some prominent theo.rists (McGuire, 
1985; Sorrentino & Hancock, 1987) have welcomed the renewed focus on personality 
variables, the focus has been limited to bounded persuasibility. Researchers have 
focused almost exclusively on how a given personality variable (e.g., self-monitoring 
or authoritarianism) affects persuasion within a particular situation or for a certain 
kind of message. There has been far less research on the second half of Janis and 
Hovland's (1959) persuasibility model -- unbounded persuasibility. 
Unbounded Persuasibility. Consistent with the adage that suggests "you can 
convince some of the people all of the time," Janis and Hovland (1959) use the 
concept of unbounded persuasibility to suggest that there may be some personality 
variables that leave a person more (or less) open to persuasion across all situations, 
or across all types of messages. Surprisingly, however, the notion of general or 
unbounded persuasibility has stayed in the shadows of research on attitude change for 
over 30 years with only a small number of researchers venturing a closer look. These 
past research efforts have typically approached unbounded persuasibility from one of 
three different angles. The first angle has been to explore the strength of unbounded 
persuasibility as a personality trait, to see how strongly attitude change on one topic 
is related to attitude change on other topics. The second angle has sought personality 
variables that can predict unbounded persuasibility across topics. Finally, the third 
angle has aimed at devising, and validating relatively simple paper-and-pencil 
measures of persuasibility that could be used in place of more cumbersome ways of 
7 
assessing openness to persuasion. Each approach to studying unbounded persuasibility 
is discussed below. 1 
B. PERSONALITY AND UNBOUNDED PERSUASIBILITY 
All of the studies of unbounded persuasibility share a common research strategy 
that sets them apart from the more frequent studies of bounded persuasibility. Studies 
that investigate how personality variables relate to bounded persuasibility measure 
participants' attitudes after exposure to a single message on a single topic. (See Line 
A of Figure 1.) Studies that investigate how personality variables relate to unbounded 
persuasibility, however, measure attitudes after exposure to messages on several 
topics. "Unbounded persuasibility" is then defined as the amount of persuasion 
produced across all of the messages. (To avoid confusion between bounded and 
unbounded persuasibility, the terms "bounded persuasion" and "unbounded 
persuasibility" will be used throughout the remainder of this paper. "Bounded 
persuasion" or simply "persuasion" will be reserved for the effects of a single message 
on one attitude. "Unbounded persuasibility" or simply "persuasibility" will be 
reserved for the effects of several messages on several attitudes.) 
The Strength of the Unbounded Persuasibility Trait 
Unbounded persuasibility could only be considered a strong trait if there were 
consistently strong correlations between the amount of persuasion produced by one 
message and the amount of persuasion produced by other messages (see Line B of 
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PAPER & PENCIL 
PERSUASIBILITY 
MEASURES 
(PPI and JFPQ) 
Figure 1: Characteristics of Persuasibility Studies 
Note: Line A represents studies that relate individual difference variables to attitude 
change; B represents studies that relate levels of persuasion among multiple topics; C 
represents studies that relate individual difference variables to unbounded 
persuasibility; and D represents studies that assess the criterion-related validity of 
persuasibility measures. 
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Figure 1). Janis and his colleagues provided the earliest evidence of an unbounded 
persuasibility trait. In his first study, Janis (1954) exposed undergraduates to 
messages on three different topics and found that participants who were persuaded by 
one message were moderately more likely to be persuaded by the other two messages. 
In a second study, Janis (1955) presented undergraduates with editorials on five topics 
and again found a small, but consistent tendency for participants either to change 
opinions on all topics or to change none of their opinions. In a third study (Janis & 
Field, 1959), high school students read ten editorials, thereby allowing Janis to 
correlate ten measures of attitude change. Eighty-seven percent of these correlations 
were positive (although not all reached traditional levels of statistical significance), 
indicating that the amount of persuasion produced by one editorial was generally 
related to the amount of persuasion produced by another editorial. 
In the stuqies that followed, other researchers (Ally, 1980; Cronkhite & Goetz, 
1971; Epting, 1967; Glass et al., 1969; Jenks, 1965; Jones, 1976; Lee, 1977; 
Silverman, Ford & Morganti, 1970; Touhey, 1973; Whittaker, 1965; Whittaker & 
f'.1eade, 1967) often found that the best predictor of persuasion on one topic was the 
amount of persuasion on other topics. These studies suggest that some people are 
generally more open to persuasion than others, and that a disposition toward 
unbounded persuasibility plays an important role in determining who does and does 
not accept a message. However, past research also suggests that unbounded 
persuasibility does not play a dominant role in the acceptance of a message. When 
they are reported, correlations among persuasion scores across topics tend to be 
10 
modest, at best. 2 
Overall, past research on unbounded persuasibility as a personality disposition 
does suggest that some people are moderately more open to persuasive messages 
whereas other people are moderately more resistant to persuasive messages. Although 
unbounded persuasibility appears to be a modest trait3, the existence of even a modest 
trait is surprising. Given that the effect of any one persuasive message depends on 
the complex interaction of source, message, style, and bounded recipient factors, it 
is surprising that any unbounded persuasibility can be detected. 
Individual Difference Correlates of Unbounded Persuasibility 
Since Janis first isolated a modest disposition toward unbounded persuasibility, 
many researchers have studied how personality variables relate to persuasion. 
However, most researchers have studied the effect of personality variables on bounded 
persuasion by exposing participants to a single message on a single topic (for recent 
reviews, see Kahle, 1984; McGuire, 1968, 1985; Wood & Stangor, in press). Only 
relatively rarely have researchers studied the effect of personality variables on 
unbounded persuasibility by exposing participants to messages on multiple topics 
(Ally, 1980; Cronkhite & Goetz, 1971; Epting, 1967; Glass et al., 1969; Janis, 1954, 
1955; Janis & Field, 1959; Jenks, 1965; Jones, 1976; Lee, 1976; Pietscher, 1981; 
Silverman, Ford & Morganti, 1965; Whittaker, 1965; Whittaker & Meade, 1967). 
(See Line C of Figure 1.) The individual difference correlates that have generated the 
most research are dogmatism, gender, social desirability, self-esteem, and anxiety. 
11 
Dogmatism (Closed-mindedn~). In his seminal work on the topic, Rokeach 
(1960) defined dogmatism in a manner that, at first glance, seems counter-intuitive. 
Intuitively, most people think of dogmatism as the tendency to be self-opinionated and 
to reject all ideas that are not consistent with established beliefs. Counter-intuitively 
however, Rokeach defined dogmatism as the tendency to "compartmentalize" one's 
beliefs. By this Rokeach meant that dogmatic (or closed-minded) people rarely 
attempt to integrate intrinsically related beliefs about a topic into a single overall 
impression. Rather, dogmatic people tend to maintain closely related and often 
contradictory beliefs in isolation of each other. Less dogmatic people, on the other 
hand, tend to integrate their beliefs. 
Based on this definition, highly dogmatic people should be more likely to agree 
with a message that runs counter to their past beliefs because they will not attempt to 
integrate their past beliefs with the message they are hearing. Less dogmatic people, 
on the other hand, should be less likely to agree with a counter-attitudinal message 
because they will try to integrate past beliefs with a discrepant message. Although it 
may seem counter-intuitive to hypothesize that dogmatism and unbounded 
persuasibility should be positively related, two studies support this contention. 
Cronkhite and Goetz ( 1971) reported that dogmatism correlated .40 with 
persuasibility, and Jenks (1965) reported a smaller (but still significant) correlation of 
.20 between these two variables. 
Gender. Results from gender studies are not as clear cut. Based on bounded 
persuasion studies that exposed men and women to a single message (for a review see 
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Eagly & Carli, 1981), some researchers have hypothesized that women might be more 
persuasible when exposed to a variety of messages. However, the research evidence 
is somewhat inconclusive for two reasons. Foremost, the findings are often 
contradictory. Although several studies have found that females were more 
persuasible than males {Epting, 1967; Glass et al. 1969; Janis & Field, 1959b; Jones, 
1976; King, 1959; Silverman et al. 1970, Study 3; Whittaker, 1965), other studies 
found either no differences between men and women (Abelson & Lesser, 1959; 
Cacioppo & ~etty, 1980; Lee, 1976; Pietscher, 1984; Silverman et al., 1970; Study 
1; Whittaker & Meade, 1967) or found that men were actually more, not less, 
persuasible than women (Silverman et al., 1970, Study 2). Second, Eagly and Carli 
(1981) have argued convincingly that men may only appear less persuasible because 
men have been more interested and more invested in the particular messages that 
researchers have used in the past. Additional research is needed to see if men and 
women differ in unbounded persuasibility after differences in interest in the messages 
are factored out. 
Social Desirability (Approval Motivation). Silverman et al. (1970) predicted 
that people who are more motivated to attain social approval would be more 
persuasible than people who are less motivated by social approval. The results from 
three studies (Silverman et al., 1970, studies 1, 2, and 3), however, do not support 
this hypothesis. Two of those studies (Study 1 and Study 3) found that social 
desirability was not related to unbounded persuasibility, and another study (Study 2) 
found that social desirability was negatively related to unbounded persuasibility, not 
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positively as predicted. This last finding suggests that resisting persuasion may be 
more socially desirable than agreeing with a message. 
Self-F.steem. As with gender, past research on self-esteem and unbounded 
persuasibility is inconclusive. Janis (1954) first suggested that people who think 
highly of themselves might also think highly of their attitudes. Accordingly, people 
of high self-esteem might be very resistant to most persuasive messages, whereas 
people of low esteem might be more open to persuasive messages. Although most 
studies have predicted and found that self-esteem is negatively correlated with 
unbounded persuasibility (Janis, 1954, 1955; Janis & Field, 1959, Silverman et al., 
1970, Study 2), other studies have found no linear relationship between self-esteem 
and unbounded persuasibility (Glass et al., 1969; Silverman et al., 1970, Study 1). 
This inconsistency of findings could exist because self-esteem might share a 
curvilinear relationship with unbounded persuasibility. Supporting this notion, 
Silverman et al. (1970, Study 3) did report.that participants with low and high self-
esteem were less persuasible than participants with moderate self-esteem. A 
curvilinear relationship between self-esteem and unbounded persuasibility is consistent 
with McGuire's ( 1969, 1985) information processing model of personality and 
persuasibility. McGuire pointed out that persuasion is the result of two-stage process. 
Before being persuaded, a message recipient must (a) pay enough attention to a 
message to comprehend its meaning, and (b) accept or yield to the message's 
_ conclusions. He also noted that a curvilinear relationship would occur between a 
personality variable and unbounded persuasibility if the personality variable related 
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positively to attention, but related negatively to acceptance, or vice versa. 
To clarify McGuire's (1969, 1985) model, Figure 2 displays the theoretical 
relationship between self-esteem and unbounded persuasibility. According to 
McGuire's theory, as self-esteem moves from low to high levels, message recipients 
are more likely to attend to a variety of messages, thereby increasing their opportunity 
to be persuaded. However, as esteem moves from low to high levels, recipients are 
less likely to accept messages, and are therefore less likely to be persuaded. In effect, 
as self-esteem grows people compensate for their increased attention by decreasing 
their acceptance of messages. The result of these two competing processes is an 
inverted U-shaped or quadratic relationship between self-esteem and unbounded 
persuasibility where the greatest amount of persuasibility should occur at moderate 
levels of self-esteem. 
Anxiety .. Curvilinearity might also explain the relationship between unbounded 
persuasibility and anxiety. Reasoning that anxiety would interfere with attention to 
a message, Janis (1954) originally hypothesized that anxiety should correlate 
n~gatively with persuasibility. Supporting this notion, he found that participants who 
were more neurotically anxious were less persuasible than participants who were not 
neurotically anxious (Janis, 1954; 1955). However, he also found that measures of 
test anxiety showed a marginally positive correlation with persuasibility (Janis & 
Field, 1959). 
The negative correlations in one study and positive correlations in another study 
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one could predict that a small amount of anxiety might promote acceptance (thereby 
increasing persuasibility), but large amount of anxiety might interfere with attention 
(thereby decreasing persuasibility). People with moderate levels of anxiety might be 
the most persuasible because they are both attentive and motivated to accept a 
message. 
Other Personality Variables. Two other personality variables might be 
related to persuasibility. The first is need-for-cognition (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982). 
Persons who have a strong need-for-cognition enjoy cognitive activity and may be 
more likely to enjoy the intellectual stimulation that comes from pondering counter-
attitudinal editorials. Persons who have a weak need-for-cognition are cognitive-
misers who may try to avoid any serious consideration of a counter-attitudinal 
message. Using McGuire's (1968; 1985) theory, we can expect a curvilinear 
relationship between unbounded persuasibility and need-for-cognition. As need-for-
cognition moves from low to high levels, message recipients ought to be more willing 
to ponder counter-attitudinal editorials, and therefore be more generally persuasible. 
However, as need-for-cognition moves from low to high levels, message recipients 
might consider arguments against each editorial, and therefore be less persuasible. 
The end result is that people who are at moderate levels of need-for-cognition should 
be. the most persuasible. To date no study has investigated either the linear or 
curvilinear relationship between need-for-cognition and unbounded persuasibility 
across a variety of messages. 
Another personality variable that might be related to unbounded persuasibility 
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is ambiguity intolerance. Phillips (1981) suggested that some people have trouble 
tolerating inconsistencies among their beliefs that come from complicated and 
ambiguous issues. According to Phillips, people who can tolerate ambiguities will not 
feel compelled to change their attitudes when faced with counter-attitudinal messages. 
On the other hand, people who cannot tolerate ambiguities will be compelled to 
change their attitudes. Unfortunately, Phillips did not test this hypothesis directly, 
and no other studies have addressed the relationship between unbounded persuasibility 
and ambiguit)". intolerance. 
Summary. Given the inconsistencies in research findings and the possibility 
of non-linear relationships, more research is needed before psychologists can draw any 
straightforward conclusions about how personality variables relate to unbounded 
persuasibility. 
Paper-and-Pencil Measures of Unbounded Persuasibility 
The last, and least explored angle to studying unbounded persuasibility has been 
through the use of self-report measures of persuasibility. In order to study 
persuasibility, most previous researchers adopted the laborious strategy of measuring 
participants' attitudes toward several topics both before and after reading counter-
attitudinal messages on those topics (see Line B, Figure 1). This strategy allowed 
researchers to define, post hoc, each participant's degree of unbounded persuasibility 
by summing across the amount of persuasion produced by each message. 
The main advantage of this pretest-posttest strategy is that unbounded 
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persuasibility scores can serve as a criterion that researchers can try to predict using 
other variables (e.g., self-esteem). Two disadvantages of this strategy, however, 
make unbounded persuasibility a very difficult area to study. First, because 
participants must be exposed to pretests, posttests, and messages on several topics, this 
strategy is cumbersome and impractical for most research settings. Second, the 
pretest-posttest strategy only provides a post hoc method of defining persuasibility 
after exposing participants to several messages. The pretest-posttest strategy was 
never intended to produce a priori predictions of how susceptible a person is to a 
variety of messages. In effect, the pretest-posttest strategy allows researchers to 
define the criterion of persuasibility, but does not provide researchers with an 
independent, a priori measure of unbounded persuasibility. 
Janis and Field Persuasibility Questionnaire (JFPQ). To facilitate more 
research on persuasibility, researchers have tried to replace the inefficient pretest-
posttest strategy with relatively short paper-and-pencil rating scales that could measure 
unbounded persuasibility efficiently and successfully. (See Line D, Figure 1.) 
Toward this goal, Janis and Field (1959) devised an 11-item paper-and-pencil scale 
that asked subjects for self-ratings of susceptibility to influence by mass 
communication and friends. However, when attempting to validate the Janis-Field 
Persuasibility Questionnaire (JFPQ), Janis and Field found that scores on their paper-
and-pencil scale could not predict a, criterion score of unbounded persuasibility, and 
. therefore could not be used as a measure of persuasibility. 
In retrospect, the JFPQ may have failed for two reasons. First, the JFPQ was 
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based on only 11 items. Perhaps, a test with more items would have been more 
predictive. Second, Janis and Field (1959) did not subject these items to any form of 
item analysis. Instead, they simply combined all 11 items into a single score without 
first eliminating items that weakened either the internal consistency or predictive 
validity of the total score. An item analysis strategy might have produced a short 
self-rating scale that was both a reliable and valid measure of persuasibility. 
Phillips Persuasibility Inventory (PPn. The next and most recent attempt to 
develop a paper-and-pencil measure of unbounded persuasibility was made by Phillips 
(1981) who relied on three hypotheses to guide his development of a persuasibility 
scale. Phillips reasoned that highly persuasible people are probably highly dogmatic, 
generally intolerant of ambiguity in their beliefs, and more likely to conform to social 
pressure. Following Rokeach's (1960) notion of dogmatism and closed belief-
systems, Phillip~ reasoned that highly dogmatic people less often try to integrate 
persuasive messages with existing beliefs. As a result, highly dogmatic people ought 
to be less likely to argue against, and more likely to accept a wide range of persuasive 
~essages than should less dogmatic people. Adopting Norton's (1976) notion of 
ambiguity intolerance, Phillips then suggested that some people have trouble 
integrating inconsistent beliefs into an existing attitude structure without changing their 
attitudes. As a result, people who are intolerant of ambiguity are more likely to 
change their attitudes when exposed to counter-attitudinal messages than are people 
who are tolerant of ambiguity. Finally, Phillips reasoned that highly persuasible 
people probably rely on other people to define their own attitudes, rather than relying 
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on their own beliefs or experiences. Such other-directed people, therefore, ought to 
~mply more readily with persuasive messages. 
Based on these hypotheses, Phillips devised a paper-and-pencil scale of 
unbounded persuasibility that included the twenty item Short-Form Dogmatism Scale 
(Trodahl & Powell, 1965), nine items from the Measure of Ambiguity Intolerance 
(MAT-50, Norton, 1975), seven items from the Personal Orientation Inventory (POI, 
Shostrom, 1964) as a measure of social compliance, and six bogus items to evaluate 
potential response biases. To test the validity of the Phillips Persuasibility Inventory 
(PPI), Phillips ( 1981) administered his inventory to participants just before they were 
placed in group discussions. As a group, participants then discussed four risk-taking 
situations, and came to a consensus about how to best solve the issues raised in each 
situation. Participants had to decide whether a fictitious person should take a new 
job, whether another fictitious person should take a gamble in a game, whether a 
young couple should risk marriage, and whether a company should build a factory in 
a foreign country. Results revealed that those participants who changed more of their 
opinions scored significantly higher on the PPI, suggesting that the PPI may be a valid 
paper-and-pencil measure of unbounded persuasibility. 
There are, however, strong reasons to question the validity of the PPI as a 
measure of unbounded persuasibility. One reason centers on how Phillips (1981) 
developed his measure of persuasibility (the PPI). By including the Personal 
Orientation Inventory (POI) into the PPI, Phillips (1981) intentionally included a 
conformity scale as a central component of his persuasibility scale. However, when 
21 
defining unbounded persuasibility, Hovland and Janis (1959), and later McGuire 
( 1968) were careful to distinguish between conformity from persuasibility. According 
to these and other theorists (Kelman, 1958), conformity involves publicly stated 
agreement with a message, whereas persuasibility involves privately felt agreement. 
People may publicly conform to the ideas being presented by other people without 
privately agreeing with those ideas. Given this important distinction, Phillips should 
have factored conformity out of the PPI, rather than include it as a central component. 
By including the POI, the Phillips measure of persuasibility blurs the distinction 
between persuasibility and conformity. 
Another related criticism is that Phillips' criterion of persuasibility also blurs 
the distinction between persuasibility and conformity. In order to get a criterion 
measure of persuasibility, participants in Phillips' study were put into small groups 
and told that each group had to come to a common consensus on several issues. 
Before debating each issue, participants privately stated their own opinions. Group 
members then publicly debated each issue until all members agreed upon one common 
position. Using this strategy, Phillips defined his criterion of unbounded 
persuasibility by how often participants abandoned their private opinions and publicly 
conceded to a consensus opinion. This strategy, however, may have produced a 
criterion measure of generalized conformity rather than a criterion of unbounded 
persuasibility. 
Because both his paper-and-pencil measure and his criterion of unbounded 
persuasibility included components of conformity, these two criticisms suggest that 
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Phillips might have developed a valid measure of conformity, rather than a valid 
measure of persuasibility. In line with this argument, Pietscher (1984) found that 
scores on the PPI were unrelated to criterion scores of unbounded persuasibility when 
persuasibility was defined using a more traditional persuasion design. Rather than 
putting participants into small groups and requiring them publicly to come to a 
common opinion on several issues, Pietscher had participants complete the PPI and 
then read persuasive messages on three topics (the military draft, the Equal Rights 
Amendment, and capital punishment). To get a criterion score of persuasibility, she 
then allowed participants to state privately their agreement with the messages. Using 
this more traditional persuasion design, Pietscher found, as expected, no relationship 
between unbounded persuasibility and PPI scores, suggesting that the PPI is not a pure 
measure of persuasibility. 
C. UNRESOLVED QUESTIONS IN PERSUASIBILITY RESEARCH 
The issues raised in the above discussion suggest three unresolved questions in 
persuasibility research. The first concerns the strength of unbounded persuasibility 
as a personality disposition, and asks how strongly the amount of persuasion produced 
by one message relates to the amount of persuasion produced by other messages. 
Although some studies suggest that a person who is persuaded by a message on one 
topic is moderately more likely to be persuaded by messages on other topics, research 
on this question is rare. For this reason, another study on the strength of 
persuasibility can increase substantially our knowledge of unbounded persuasibility. 
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A second question asks how strongly various personality variables relate to 
unbounded persuasibility. Given the largely inconsistent findings in this area, no 
straightforward conclusions can be drawn about any particular personality variable. 
Furthermore, given the possibility of non-linear relationships between personality 
variables and unbounded persuasibility, additional research that tests specifically for 
non-linear relationships is needed. 
The third unresolved question is whether a valid paper-and-pencil measure of 
unbounded persuasibility can be devised. At this point there is no measure that can 
predict a priori who will most likely and who will least likely change their attitudes 
across a variety of topics. Such a measure would have both important theoretical and 
practical uses. For instance, such a measure would be helpful in testing theories that 
predict individual differences in attitude change. It could also be helpful, among other 
possible applications, in determining who might benefit most from cognitively based 
therapy programs that rely in large part on persuasion and attitude change. 
D. GOALS OF THE CURRENT STUDY 
The current study was conducted with the above three issues in mind. The first 
goal was to assess the strength of unbounded persuasibility as a personality 
disposition. This was assessed by computing the average correlation between the 
levels of persuasion produced by four different messages. 
The second goal was to see how several personality variables relate to 
unbounded persuasibility. The answers to the following questions were sought. 
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1. Does gender relate to unbounded persuasibility? Specifically, 
are women more open to a variety of persuasive messages than 
men (cf. Eagly & Carli, 1981)? Moreover, if there are gender 
differences, can these differences be attributed to male-female 
differences in interest in the topic of the message? 
2. How does dogmatism relate to unbounded persuasibility? As 
others (Cronkhite & Goetz, 1971; Jenks, 1965; Phillips, 1981) 
have predicted, is there a positive relationship such that highly 
dogmatic people are more susceptible to a wide range of 
persuasive messages than less dogmatic people? 
3. How does social desirability relate to persuasibility? Common 
sense would suggest that people who are highly motivated to 
attain social approval should be more likely to adopt the 
attitudes of other people. However, past findings suggest the 
opposite is true and that people who are motivated to attain 
approval generally resist persuasion. · 
4. How does self-esteem relate to persuasibility? Are people low 
self-esteem more open to general persuasion than people with 
high self-esteem? Or, is there a curvilinear relationship between 
esteem and persuasibility? 
5. How does anxiety relate to persuasibility? Is the relationship 
negative as Janis (1954, 1955) predicted, or curvilinear as 
McGuire's theory (1968, 1985) would predict? 
6. How do individual differences in need-for-cognition relate to 
persuasibility? If there is a relationship between need-for-
cognition and persuasibility, is the relationship curvilinear as 
would be predicted by McGuire's theory (1968, 1985)? 
7. How does ambiguity intolerance relate to persuasibility? Are 
people who less tolerant of ambiguity more likely to agree with 
a range of counter-attitudinal messages (cf. Phillips, 1981)? 
The third goal of this study was to develop and evaluate psychometrically a 
new paper-and-pencil measure of unbounded persuasibility. Toward this last goal, the 
current study sought the following: 
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1. To derive a new paper-and-pencil measure of unbounded 
persuasibility. This new scale was lli2.t based on a series of 
personality ~ that were initially designed to measure other 
personality traits. Instead, a new scale was derived from a large 
pool of items that were specifically written to measure 
persuasibility. Stated differently, this study did not follow the 
multiple-construct approach used by Phillips (1981), but instead, 
attempted to build a more homogeneous, more straightforward, 
and more direct measure of persuasibility. {This test is hereafter 
referred to as the P-Scale.) 
2. To compare the predictive validity of three paper-and-pencil 
measures of persuasibility tests. Scores on the JFPQ, PPI, and 
the newer P-Scale test were correlated against a criterion of 
persuasibility in order to learn which of these measures was 
most predictive of attitude change across topics. 
IT.METHOD 
A. PILOT RESEARCH. 
Before these goals could be met, four pilot studies were conducted. The first 
of these studies identified four attitude issues on which undergraduates were 
ambivalent and could be persuaded to change their attitudes. These issues involved 
the practice of euthanasia, the traditions regarding marriage for Catholic priests, the 
use of selective admissions policies at publicly funded universities, and the imposition 
of mandatory drug testing for employees of private companies. The second pilot 
study identified the salient and cogent beliefs that served as the foundation of attitudes 
toward these four issues. The third pilot study helped create attitude scales and 
editorials that could effectively persuade undergraduates to adopt new attitudes toward 
euthanasia, married priests, university admissions policies, and drug testing. Finally, 
the fourth pilot study assessed the internal consistency of the P-Scale and its initial 
pool of items that were written as a paper-and-pencil measure of persuasibility. (See 
Appendix A for a detailed discussion of the exact goals, procedures and findings from 
these studies.) 
Having produced reliable attitude measures, persuasive "pro" and "con" 
editorials on four issues, and an internally consistent pool of paper-and-pencil items 
for a persuasibility measure, all of the necessary stimulus materials were assembled 
to test hypotheses regarding the degree, the correlates, and the measurement of 
26 
persuasibility. 
B. THE FINAL STUDY 
Subjects 
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Three-hundred and twenty-seven students from Loyola University of Chicago 
were recruited for a study on how people's personalities relate to their attitudes. 
Students in five introductory psychology courses and two statistics courses were given 
credit toward their course grades for participating in two experimental sessions that 
were separated by at least one week. Participants were predominantly female (68 % ) 
and averaged 18. 7 years of age (S = 1. 80). Because 13 (or 4 % ) of participants who 
attended the first experimental session failed to attend the second session, the 
following analyses were conducted using data from 314 participants who attended both 
sessions. 
Materials 
Attitude Scales. Participants were asked to complete scales that assessed their 
attitudes toward four issues: euthanasia, married priests, university admissions, and 
drug testing. Two different response formats were used to assess each attitude. First, 
participants used a seven-point Likert-style format to indicate how strongly they 
agreed with or disagreed with various statements about a particular issue. For 
instance, participants used a scale that ranged from 1 (disagree very strongly) to 7 
(agree very strongly) to indicate whether they thought "there are good reasons to 
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support euthanasia." Second, participants used a 7-point semantic-differential format 
to describe their feelings about each issue. For example, respondents used a 7-point 
scale to indicate whether euthanasia was closer to being "good" or closer to being 
"bad," in their personal opinion. Ten Likert-style statements and 14 semantic-
differential pairs were used to assess attitudes toward each of the four issues. 
Furthermore, participants were asked how much they had heard ( 1 =none, 
4 =very much) previously about euthanasia, married priests, university admissions 
policies, and _drug testing, and how important each issue was to them (l=very 
unimportant, 5 =very important). (See Appendix B for copies of all attitude scales.) 
Counter-attitudinal Editorials. Each participant was asked to read, in all, a 
set of four editorials dealing with euthanasia, married priests, university admissions, 
and drug testing. Because each of these editorials had to run counter to a participant's 
attitudes, eight different editorials were used in this study. For each of the four 
issues, both "pro" and "con" editorials were used. In all, there was one editorial that 
supported the use of euthanasia, and one that opposed euthanasia; one that supported, 
and one that opposed marriage for priests; one that supported, and one that opposed 
open admissions to universities; and, one that supported, and one that opposed 
mandatory drug testing. Each editorial was written specifically for this study, and 
ranged between 630 and 740 words. Pilot research found that each editorial was 
effective in changing the opinions of its readers. (See Appendix C for copies of the 
eight editorials.) 
Personality Scales. Participants were also asked to complete several 
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personality scales that measured dogmatism, social desirability, self-esteem, anxiety, 
ambiguity intolerance, and need-for-cognition. Specifically, participants completed 
the Marlowe-Crowne Social-Desirability Scale (Crowne & Marlowe, 1967), the 
Feeling of Inadequacy Scale (Eagly, 1967), the Trait Anxiety Inventory {Speilberger 
et al., 1983), and the Need-For-Cognition Scale4 (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982). (See 
Appendix D for copies of these personality scales.) 
Participants also completed the Phillips (1981) Persuasibility Inventory (PPI). 
(See Appendix E.) This last inventory was built with subscales that allowed us to 
measure dogmatism and ambiguity intolerance. The first subscale consisted of 20 
items (numbers 1, 3, 4, 7, 9, 12, 13, 16, 18, 21, 24, 27, 28, 31, 33, 36, 37, 40, 41, 
and 42) from a short-form of the Rokeach Dogmatism Scale (Trodahl & Powell, 
1965). The second subscale consisted of nine items (6, 10, 15, 19, 22, 25, 30, 34, 
and 39) from the Ambiguity Intolerance Scale (Norton, 1975). 
Paper-and-Pencil Measures of Persuasibility. Finally, three paper-and-
pencil measures of persuasibility were used in this study. These self-rating scales 
included the Phillips Persuasibility Inventory (PPI, 1981), the Janis and Field 
Persuasibility Questionnaire (JFPQ, 1959), and a newly devised persuasibility scale 
(P-Scale). It should be kept in mind that the PPI itself was used as a measure of 
persuasibility, and its subscales were used as measures of personality variables. (See 
Appendix E for copies of each persuasibility scale.) 
The newly devised P-Scale contained initially 62 items that were written 
specifically to measure persuasibility. Various personality traits and attitude change 
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processes served as a basis for devising these items. The items were written to reflect 
the working assumptions that highly persuasible people are: 
1. more certainty-oriented than uncertainty-oriented; 
2. less confident of themselves and their attitudes; 
3. more likely to compare their attitudes to the attitudes of other people; 
4. more able to see issues from different perspective; 
5. less reactive in the protection of current attitudes; and 
6. less apt to see attitude change as a negative event. 
Two personality traits -- certainty orientation and self-esteem -- were included 
in these assumptions, and served as a foundation for some of the initial items. First, 
certainty orientation (Sorrentino & Hancock, 1987) represents a person's motivation 
to process carefully any messages that might complicate or contradict established 
attitudes. Uncertainty-oriented people are motivated to process messages thorough-
ly, and tend to be very critical in their acceptance of a message. Certainty-oriented 
people, however, simply want to be given the "correct" attitude, and try to avoid 
careful processing of messages, tending to accept messages uncritically. Thus, several 
items were written that addressed how carefully participants process messages, and 
how often they accept messages uncritically. Second, self-confidence and self-esteem 
were used as a basis for some questions. Because some past research on persuasibility 
suggests that people who suffer from low self-esteem are more open to persuasion, 
several items were included that addressed how confidently participants hold their 
opinions and how often they believe their opinions are correct. 
Along with these two personality traits, three attitude change processes were 
included in the working definition of a highly persuasible person. First, the notion 
of social comparison (Allen & Wilder, 1977) was used. We reasoned that highly 
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persuasible people more often compare their attitudes to the attitudes of other people. 
Second, the notion of a perceptual shift or a qualitative change in how a person views 
an attitude issue was used. Based on the theorizing of Upshaw and Ostrom (1984) we 
reasoned that people who more frequently report being able to see an issue from a 
"new point of view" would be more likely to change their opinions than those who 
rarely shift their perspective. Finally, the notion of psychological reactance (Brehm 
& Brehm, 1981) served as a basis for some items. It was assumed that people who 
are not highly protective of their attitudes will be easier to persuade. Based on these 
three attitude change processes, several items were written that addressed how often 
participants compare their attitudes to the attitudes of others, how easily they can see 
an issue from another point of view, and how protective they are of their own 
attitudes. 
In addition, several questions were written to assess participants' feelings about 
attitude change. It was assumed .that participants who thought attitude change was a 
negative event and indicative of personal weakness would be resistant to messages, 
and that participants who thought attitude change was a positive event and indicative 
of self-improvement would be more open to persuasive messages. 
Procedures 
Session I. Participants were given a packet of questionnaires to complete when 
they arrived for the first experimental session. In the beginning of the packet, 
participants were asked to describe some recent occasions during which another person 
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tried to influence their opinions. This was done under the assumption that participants 
could more accurately complete persuasibility measures if they first spent some time 
remembering their reactions to recent attitude change situations. 
After describing these situations, participants were instructed to work their way 
through the rest of the packet which began with the P-Scale, followed with the PPI, 
the JFPQ, and the MCSD scale, and ended with the scales that assessed participants' 
attitudes toward euthanasia, married priests, university admissions policies, and drug 
testing. After completing these scales, participants made arrangements to attend a 
second experimental session. Most participants (58.4 % ) returned within 10 to 14 days 
after their first session (average number of days between sessions= 10.9, S =5.0), and 
none were allowed to return before at least three days had passed. 
Interim Period. Before attending a second session, a series of counter-
attitudinal editorials were selected individually for each participant. To determine 
which editorials to select, the four attitude scales were scored by research assistants. 
After (a) averaging together responses to individual Likert-style and semantic-
differential scales, and (b) determining whether the average scores were greater than 
or less than the midway point of 4.0 on the scales that ranged from 1 to 7, research 
assistants determined which attitude positions a participant favored (i.e., those with 
average scores greater than 4.0) and which positions a participant opposed (i.e., those 
with average scores less than 4.0). Based on these determinations, four counter-
attitudinal editorials were then selected for individual participants. In those rare cases 
where the average score on the attitude items was exactly 4.0, research assistants 
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selected editorials based on the flip of a coin. 
Session II. During the second session, participants were given another packet 
of materials. This second packet contained the four counter-attitudinal editorials, each 
followed by its corresponding attitude scale. This packet also contained three 
personality scales, including the Feeling of Inadequacy Scale (Eagly, 1967), the Trait 
Anxiety Inventory (Speilberger et al., 1983), ~d the Need-For-Cognition Scale 
(Cacioppo & Petty, 1982). After completing the post-editorial attitude scales, and 
filling out the personality scales, participants were debriefed. (The ordering of 
materials and potential order-effects are discussed further in Endnote 5.) 
The most important feature of this method was that four bounded persuasion 
scores (one produced by each counter-attitudinal editorial) could be computed for each 
participant. These scores, in tum, allowed us (a) to assess the strength of unbounded 
persuasibility as a personality trait by analyzing the relationships among the four 
bounded persuasion scores, (b) to test hypot.heses regarding the relationships among 
personality variables and unbounded persuasibility scores, defined by summing across 
the four bounded persuasion scores, and (c) to evaluate the validity a three paper-
and-pencil measures of persuasibility. Results will be discussed in light of these three 
goals. 
ID. RESULTS 
A. STRENGTH OF UNBOUNDED PERSUASIBILITY 
If unbounded persuasibility is a personality trait that plays a dominant role in 
determining someone's acceptance or rejection of a message, then there should be a 
positive correlation between the amount of persu~sion produced by a message on one 
issue and the amount of persuasion produced by different messages on different issues. 
That is, people who are unpersuaded (or highly persuaded) by messages about 
euthanasia should also be unpersuaded (or highly persuaded) by messages about 
married priests, university admissions, or drug testing. If, on the other hand, 
persuasibility plays an unimportant role in the acceptance or rejection of a message, 
there should be a non-significant correlation between the amount of persuasion 
produced by different messages. 
Before the strength of unbounded per.suasibility could be assessed, the amount 
of persuasion produced by each editorial (i.e., bounded persuasion scores) had to be 
computed for each participant. This was done in two stages. First, item change 
scores were computed for each of the Likert-style and semantic-differential items that 
measured attitudes toward each of the four issues (euthanasia, married priests, 
university admissions, and drug testing). Item change scores were based on the 
difference between pre-editorial (Session I) and post-editorial (Session II) responses 
- on each item. It is important to note that not all change between pre- and post-
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editorial responses indicated persuasion, and that some change in responses actually 
indicated reactance, the very opposite of persuasion. If a response changed reactively 
in the direction opposed by an editorial, then the item change score (i.e, Session I -
Session II) obtained a negative value. If, however, a response was coaxed in the 
direction advocated by an editorial, then the item change score obtained a positive 
value. 
After change scores were computed for each item, bounded persuasion scores 
were computed separately for each of the four editorial topics by averaging together 
the 24 item change scores that were derived from the Likert and semantic differential 
items. 6 The bounded persuasion scores produced by the editorials on euthanasia, 
married priests, university admission policies, and drug testing all reached acceptable 
levels of internal consistency (Standardized Alphas = . 89, . 93, . 91, and . 93, 
respectively). A~ can be seen by the high number of positive bounded persuasion 
scores in Table 1, most participants were persuaded by the different editorials. 
Depending on the topic, between 72 and 75 percent of the participants changed their 
at~itudes in the directions advocated by the editorials they read. However, a 
substantial minority (between 28 and 25 percent) of participants did change their 
attitudes in the direction opposed by an editorial. 
After the four bounded persuasion scores were computed, it was possible to 
assess the strength of unbounded persuasibility by inter-correlating the four bounded 
persuasion scores. As can be seen in Table 2, all of the correlations between 
persuasion scores were significantly greater than zero. The average correlation among 
Table 1 
Frequencies and Qescriptiye Statistics for Bounded Persuasion and 
Unbounded Persuasibility scores 
RANGE OF EUriwfAsl:A2 1< .. HARRIED UNIVERSITY DRUG UNBOUNDED 
SCOllES 1 : ·.·.·.. . .. ·.·•·•··.··•·• ? PllliSTS11 ADMISSIONS, TESTl~······· ··.·• ·SCC)lt!S* 
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. · 
2 3 ILL·.·· ... .• 
1 1 2 ·< ..••. > Lt. 
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2 Bounded persuasion scores represent the average of 24 item change 
scores. Positive (Negative) scores represent a change in attitudes in 
the direction advocated (opposed) by an editorial. For exomple, a 
persuasion score of +2.0 (-2.0) indicated a participant changed 
his/her responses by two points in the direction advocated (opposed) 
by an editorial. 
3 Unbounded persuasibility scores were computed for each participant 
by averaging together the four bounded persuasion scores. Higher 
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among the four bounded persuasion scores (using Fisher's transformations) was .21 
(Qf=271, one-tailed 12< .025), indicating that the level of persuasion produced by one 
editorial was positively associated with the level of persuasion produced by different 
editorials on different topics. 
However, the modest size of this correlation also indicates that unbounded 
persuasibility was not a dominant factor in persuasion. Levels of persuasion produced 
by one editorial were not closely related to the levels of persuasion produced by other 
editorials. Furthermore, the average correlation increased to only .22 after we 
adjusted the correlations among bounded persuasion scores for the lack of reliability 
inherent in each of the four persuasion scores. As a result, an average of only 4.8% 
of variance in one persuasion score could be predicted from variance in the remaining 
persuasion scores. 7 
B. INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCE CORRELATES OF PERSUASIBILITY 
Next we investigated the linear and non-linear (quadratic) relationships between 
persuasibility and several individual difference variables. Before investigating these 
relationships, unbounded persuasibility scores were computed by averaging together 
the four bounded persuasion scores. (See Table 1 for the distribution of unbounded 
persuasibility scores.) As could be expected of any scale that was based on only four 
items that are modestly related, the resulting unbounded persuasibility scores had only 
modest internal consistency (Standardized Alpha= .50). 
The first set of analyses tested the hypothesis that women are, on the average, 
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more persuasible than men. There was only qualified support for this hypothesis. 
Independent samples t-tests on unbounded persuasibility scores revealed that women 
were only marginally more persuasible across topics than men. (See Table 3 for 
results of this analysis.) Subsequent analyses of bounded persuasion scores revealed 
that women were only more persuaded than men after reading editorials about 
mandatory drug testing. Women, however, were not more persuaded than men by 
editorials dealing with euthanasia, marriage for Catholic priests, and university 
admission policies. (See Table 3 for results of these analyses.) 
To see if gender differences in the acceptance of drug testing messages could 
be attributed to gender difference in interest in that issue, an analysis of covariance 
(ANCOV A) was performed on bounded persuasion scores using gender as a grouping 
variable and participants' interest in drug testing as a covariate. "Interest" was 
defined as how important drug testing was to each participant (1 =very unimportant, 
5 =very important). Using "interest," however, did not appreciably change the 
difference between men and women in response to messages on drug testing. Women 
remained marginally more open to messages on drug testing than did men 
[.E(l,279)=3.168, 12=.075]. 
The second set of analyses assessed the linear relationship between unbounded 
persuasibility scores and scores on the various personality scales (i.e., dogmatism, 
social desirability, self-esteem, anxiety, need-for-cognition, and ambiguity 
. intolerance). Analyses revealed that unbounded persuasibility scores were not linearly 
related to either higher levels of dogmatism, stronger motivation for social approval, 
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~: Means are in bold-faced type and N's are in parentheses. • J2 < .05, one-tailed. 
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higher anxiety, higher needs for cognition, or lower self-esteem. (See Table 4 for 
correlations between generalized persuasibility scores and each personality scale. For 
completeness, both the inter-correlations among the various personality scales and 
descriptive statistics for each scale are also provided in Table 4.) Only ambiguity 
intolerance showed a significant, albeit modest, relationship with unbounded 
persuasibility. As expected, participants who were less tolerant of ambiguity in their 
lives were generally more persuaded by a variety of messages. 
Given that only ambiguity intolerance showed a linear relationship with 
unbounded persuasibility scores, linear relationships between the various personality 
scales and the four bounded persuasion scores were examined. That is, each 
personality scale was correlated with the amount of persuasion produced on each issue 
separately, rather than on all issues simultaneously. As can be seen in Table 5, 
dogmatism, social desirability, anxiety, and need-for-cognition could not be used 
accurately to predict any of the bounded persuasion scores. Only ambiguity 
intolerance and self-esteem were, at best, modestly related to any of the bounded 
persuasion scores. 
As an exploratory follow-up, we used polynomial regression techniques to test 
for non-linear (quadratic) relationships between personality variables and unbounded 
persuasibility scores. In all of these analyses, we used non-linear equations to predict 
unbounded persuasibility scores from scores on the personality scales. Analyses were 
done separately for each personality scale, and each analysis was done hierarchically 
by entering second-order polynomials to test for quadratic relationships after entering 
Table 4 
Correlations Amon& Unbounded Persuasibility Scores and Personality Scales 
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first-order polynomials. As can be seen Table 6, there were no significant quadratic 
relationships between generalized persuasibility and any of the personality scales. 
There was, however, a marginally significant curvilinear relationship between social 
desirability and unbounded persuasibility such that people with moderate MCSD 
scores were more open to persuasion than people with either high or low MCSD 
scores. 
C. VALIDITY OF PAPER-AND-PENCIL MEASURES OF PERSUASIBILITY 
The last objective of this study was to evaluate the validity of three paper-
and-pencil scales that were designed as measures of unbounded persuasibility. 
Specifically, the goal was to see how accurately the Phillips Persuasibility Inventory 
(PPI, 1981), the Janis and Field Persuasibility Questionnaire (JFPQ, 1959), and the 
newly devised P-scale could predict unbounded persuasibility scores. However, 
before reporting on these last results, the procedures used to select items from the P-
scale will be described. 
Item Selection for the P-Scale 
Rather than measure persuasibility with the entire pool of 62 items (see 
Appendix D for copies of these items), an attempt was made to reduce the number of 
individual items into a more manageable set of common factors. For this reason, a 
_ factor analytic approach was used to select and reject items from the initial item pool. 
The factor analysis was done in eight stages. 
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Table 6 
Summary of Findings from Quadratic Regressions of Unbounded Persuasibility Scores 
on Personality Scales 
. · 
····· · . 
.. . 
Slope ·:>1.··· ::· .df ' .. · ... ·.····1t< ... 
1 (D) . Doglllatism .00 -.04 280 1.00 
· ... 
(SD) Social Desir. -1.74 -1.46 275 .15 
(SE) Self-Esteem .00 .00 281 1.00 
(TA) Trait Anxiety .00 .04 282 1.00 
(AI) Ambig. Intol. .05 .98 280 .35 
(NFC) Need-For-Cognit. .01 .65 277 .50 
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In the first stage, the total sample of 314 participants was divided randomly 
into two sub-samples: an initial or exploratory sample (n= 157), and a hold-out or 
validation sample (n = 157). Dividing the total sample into sub-samples made it 
possible to cross-validate the findings in the eighth and final stage of the item 
analysis. 
In the second stage, a principal components analysis was performed on the first 
sample to estimate the number of factors within the initial item pool. The number of 
factors was initially estimated by the number of components that (a) had eigenvalues 
greater than 1. 00, (b) explained at least 5 % of the total variance in the correlation 
matrix, and (c) contained at least three items with loadings of absolute value greater 
than .40. As seen in Table 7, only three components met these criteria in the first 
sample. Moreover, an inspection of the scree plot (see Figure 3) from the first 
sample gave further support to a three-factor solution. 
The third stage in selecting items was to rotate the components. To determine 
if the three components were oblique or orthogonal, a principal component analysis 
with oblique (oblimin) rotation was performed on the first sample. The resulting 
correlations among components revealed that the three components were, in fact, 
orthogonal. Scores on the first component correlated only .025 and .079 with scores 
on the second and third components, respectively, and scores on the second 
component showed virtually no correlation {r=-.006) with scores on the third 
component (all 12's=n.s.). 
Having determined that the 62 items in the initial item pool could be reduced 
Table 7 
Eis;envalues and Percent of Variance Explained b_y a Principal Component 
Analysis of the Initial Pool of 62 Items (Sample 1: N = 156) 
... 
··• 
EIGENV ALVES COMPONENT 
. 
: ... · .. :.· ... 
··:· 
. 
····•. <J>ERc:Em>< ·/NUMB:ER.·bF···:·:······ ··.·········E··~ .. XP ... !:fI.AINE .•. IAN.()T .......•.... ·.r .. BD".·•·.' .• ... :.·:·············:··.••: .••..•.•..• :•... ···:······ ···········•r &~=·····:······· \ }~1~4@1 < 
1 6.84 11.0 16 
2 5.36 8.6 12 
3 3.73 6.0 6 
4 2.55 4.1 6 
5 2.38 3.8 2 
6 1.88 3.0 0 
7 1.80 2.9 1 
8 1.70 2.7 0 
9 1.60 2.6 1 
10 1.51 2.4 0 
11 1.47 2.4 0 
12 1.33 2.1 0 
13 1.29 2.1 1 
14 1.26 2.0 0 
15 1.24 2.0 0 
16 1.18 1.9 0 
17 1.16 1.9 0 
18 1.10 1.8 0 
19 1.08 1.8 0 
20 1.05 1.7 0 
21 1.00 1.6 0 
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Figure 3: Scree Plot from a Principal Component Analysis 
of the Initial Pool of 62 Items (Sample 1: N = 157) ~ 00 
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to three orthogonal components, the fourth step was to reject the items that did not 
load strongly on .any component. To accomplish this, a factor analysis (as opposed 
to a principal component analysis) was performed, using a three-factor solution with 
an orthogonal (varimax) rotation. The size of the orthogonally rotated loadings for 
each item were then inspected. A decision was made to reject those items that did not 
have loadings with absolute values greater than .40 on any of the three factors, and 
to retain for further analyses those items that did have loadings with absolute values 
greater than .40. Using this criterion, 13 items (numbers 2, 11, 12, 13, 15, 22, 23, 
25, 33, 37, 42, 53, and 58) were retained for the first factor, and 11 items (numbers 
1, 3, 6, 9, 10, 16, 18, 19, 32, 49, and 52) were retained for the second factor. The 
third factor was dropped entirely because only two items (numbers 40 and 42) had 
loadings with absolute values greater than .40 in the first sample. This procedure 
reduced the initial item pool from 62 to 24 items. 
The fifth step was to repeat the ab~ve procedures (again, for just the first 
sample) using only the 24 items that were retained from the initial pool. To re-
estimate the number of factors among the 24 items, another principal components 
analysis (rather than a factor analysis) was conducted. Results revealed that the first 
two components accounted for 19.4% and 16.0% of the total variance in the reduced 
correlation matrix, respectively, and that no other component accounted for more than 
6% of the total variance, or had more than two items with loadings of absolute value 
. greater than .40 (see Table 8). 
After determining that the reduced pool of 24 items contained two components, 
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Table 8 
Eiienyalues and Percent of Variance Explained by a Principal Component Analysis of 
the Reduced Pool of 24 Items for Both Samples 
1 4.66 19.4 13 1 4.47 18.6 13 
2 3.85 16.0 11 2 3.62 15.1 8 
3 1.40 5.8 1 3 1.49 6.2 2 
4 1.29 5.4 1 4 1:46 6.1 2 
5 1.08 4.5 1 5 1.34 5.6 2 
6 1.03 4.3 2 6 1.13 4.7 2 
7 1.08 4.5 1 
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the sixth step was to derive factor loadings for each of the items. To accomplish this, 
a second factor analysis was performed, using a two-factor solution with an oblique 
(oblimin) rotation. However, because this analysis revealed that the two factors were 
again orthogonal (factor correlation =.070, 12=n.s.), the two-component solution was 
rotated orthogonally (using a varimax rotation) to produce factor loadings. 
The two-factor solution and the resulting rotated factor loadings (from the sixth 
stage) were derived from the initial (or exploratory) sample only, and needed to be 
cross-validated. Therefore, -in the seventh stage of item selection, a principal 
component analysis was repeated on the reduced item pool using the hold-out (or 
validation) sample. Compared to the components in the initial sample (described in 
the fifth stage), the components in the hold-out sample explained similar proportions 
of total variance (see Table 8) and produced similar scree plots (see Figures 4 and 5). 
In the eighth and final stage, orthogonally rotated factor loadings were derived 
from the second sample. As can be seen in Table 9, there was a close correspondence 
between the rotated factor loadings in both samples [Cattell's .S. (Factor 1) = .883, 
Cattell' s .S. (factor 2) = . 832]. 8 (See Table 9 for factor loadings.) Based on the cross-
validation, only one additional item (number 19) was dropped because it loaded more 
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Table 9 
V arimax Rotated Factor Loadini:S for the Reduced Pool of 24 Items by Factor and Sample 
:.' '· ......... ·: /'//· ··: :' .. ::. : }:,: :,:: . .''/ 
< J,,1. <') -.637 -.600 • • 
.581 • .631 • 
.581 • .522 • 
-.541 • -.528 • 
.. 
13''.'' ,: 
:.. ''·. :·. ::.:- . .:....: .. .539 • • • 
.526 • • • 
.499 • .629 • 
.495 • .585 '\ • 
-.479 • -.453 • 
.476 • .480 • 
.450 • .426 • 
.433 • • • 
.421 • .501 • 
• .619 • • 
18 • .603 • .494 
3 • .583 • • 
16 • .581 • .668 
. ·... · .. j~q··· .'·.'' · .. • .577 • .552 
• .563 .. • 
• .544 • .570 
.. ,·.:,. ,·. 
49 .. ··· • .452 • .771 
• .509 .. :< .. , ... • .446 
.481 • 
:::· .. · .... ·.· ·. . .'· 
.... /:/·:Jl.Y .......... · ... '.:.:,. • .400 
• • • .416 
~: Asterisks represent factor loadings with absolute values less than .40. 
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Interpretation of P-Scale Factors 
Given the close correspondence between factor loadings in each sample, the 
samples were recombined and a single set of factor loadings was derived (see Table 
10). An inspection of the items that load on each factor suggested that Factor 1 of 
the P-scale represented participants' ~or confidence in their own opinions (e.g., 
"I sometimes do not trust my own judgments," "I usually give into people because 
I eventually realize they are right.") and that Factor 2 represented the nei:ative or 
positive reactions participants have during attitude change (e.g., "I feel uncomfortable 
if someone convinces me to adopt a new opinion," "It bothers me to change my 
opinion."). 
The interpretations given to these two factors echo two of the assumptions 
made earlier when defining a highly persuasible person. It should be recalled that 
highly persuasible people were assumed to be (a) more certainty-oriented, (b) more 
likely to compare their attitudes to the attitudes of other people, (c) more apt to see 
issues from different perspectives, (d) less confident of themselves and their attitudes, 
(~) less apt to see attitude change as negative and (t) less reactive in the protection of 
current attitudes. The last three of these assumptions -- low self-confidence, the 
tendency to see some benefits to attitude change, and the lack of defensive resistance 
to attitude change -- are consistent with the interpretations that Factor 1 represented 
self-doubt and that Factor 2 represented reactions to attitude change. 
The above interpretations, however, are only subjective. To get a more 
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Table 10 
Final Varimax Rotated Factor Loadings for the Full Sample (N =312) 
rmM.•····· 
People win me over to their point of view. 
I usually hold onto my opinions even when 
other people hold the opposite opinions. 
I usually feel confident about my beliefs. 
I usually trust that my own opinions are right, 
even when people try to change my mind. 
In a discussion I probably change my mind 
more easily than most people. 
During discussions with people, I hold onto 
my opinions more strongly than most other 
people. 
I've found that I am usually correct if I trust 
my own judgment. 
I put more trust in my judgment than in the 
judgment of other people. 
I sometimes do not trust my own judgment. 
I usually "give in" to people because I 
eventually realize they are right. 
Compared to most people, I'm an 
independent, free thinker. 
Many times I am more convinced that my 
opinions are correct after someone tries to 
change my mind. 
I almost always believe that my opinions are 
correct. 
Continued on the next page. 
Table 10 (Continued) 
I feel uncomfortable if someone convinces 
me to adopt a new opinion. . 
Changing my opinions make me doubt by 
integrity. 
I get defensive when people try to change my 
opinions. 
Ususally I've felt uncomfortable when people 
try to convince me of their ideas. 
It bothers me to change my opinions. 
It is more important that people see my 
./<·>,(i)? .<1 point of view than it is for me to see things 
from their point of view. 
When people try to change my mind, I try 
hard to prevent them from accomplishing it. 
Rather than listening while people are 
talking to me, I am usually thinking of things 
to rebut what they are saying. 
Usually I've wanted to do the opposite of 
what people try to convince me to do. 
I think people who change their opinions are 
usually weak. 
~: Asterisks represent factor loadings with absolute values less than .40. 
S1 
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objective interpretation of each factor, we computed scores on two scales. P-Scale 1 
(Self-Doubt) was created by averaging together responses to the 13 items (numbers 
2, 11, 12, 13, 15, 22, 23, 25, 33, 37, 42, 53, and 58) that had loadings with absolute 
values greater than .40 on Factor 1 in the combined sample. All items were coded 
such that higher scores on this scale represented ereater doubt in one's own attitudes. 
P-Scale 2 (Reactions to Attitude Change) was created by averaging responses to the 
10 items (numbers 1, 3, 6, 9, 10, 16, 18, 32, 49, and 53) that had loadings with 
absolute values greater than .40 on Factor 2. All items were coded such that high 
scores represented positive reactions to attitude change, and low scores represented 
negative reactions to attitude change. 
After computing scores for P-Scale 1 and P-Scale 2, each scale was correlated 
with the various personality scales (see Table 11). Consistent with subjective 
interpretations, P-Scale 1 (Self-Doubt) showed a strong negative relationship with self-
esteem such that people who doubted their attitudes reported lower self-esteem. 
Furthermore, people who doubted their attitudes tended to be more anxious and to get 
less satisfaction from cognitive activity. 
Consistent with the interpretation of P-Scale 2 (Reactions to Attitude Change), 
people who scored high on this scale tended to be less dogmatic and more open to 
attitude change, less anxious, and better able to tolerate ambiguity. People who 
scored low on this scale appeared anxious, intolerant of ambiguity and perceived 
attitude change as more negative. These findings suggest the P-Scale 2 represents the 
emotional reactions participants had to changing their opinions. Higher scores on this 
59 
Table 11 
















~: Correlations are in bold-faced type and 




















scale appear to represent more acceptance of attitude change, whereas lower scores 
represent the cognitive, emotional and behavioral rejection of attitude change. 
Criterion-Related Validity of Paper-and-Pencil Measures 
The last objective of this study was to evaluate the validity of the different 
paper-and-pencil measures of persuasibility. Specifically, analyses were performed 
to see how accurately unbounded persuasibility scores could be predicted from the 
Phillips Persuasibility Inventory (PPI, 1981), the Janis and Field Persuasibility 
Questionnaire (JFPQ, 1959), P-Scale 1 (Self-Doubt) and P-Scale 2 (Reactions to 
Attitude Change). To accomplish this, scores on the PPI were computed by averaging 
together scores on its three subscales (Ambiguity Intolerance, Dogmatism, and 
Conformance )9, scores on the JFPQ were computed by averaging together responses 
to its 11 items, a~d scores on each factor scale (Self-Doubt, and Reactions to Attitude 
Change) were computed by averaging together responses to those items with loadings 
greater than .40 in absolute value. 
Although all of these measures produced acceptable levels of reliability (alphas: 
PPI=.729, JFPQ=.737, P-Scale 1=.817, and P-Scale 2=.778), none of them 
produced significant validity coefficients. (See Table 12 for correlations between 
paper-and-pencil persuasibility measures and unbounded persuasibility scores.) Doubt 
in one's attitudes (P-Scale 1), and negative reactions to attitude change (P-Scale 2) 
tended to be associated with low persuasibility, but the correlations did not approach 
acceptable levels of statistical significance. High scores on the PPI tended to be 
61 
Table 12 




P-SCALE 1: Self-Doubt 
P-SCALE 2: Reactions 
PPI 

























































Notes: Correlations are in bold-faced type and probability levels are in light-faced 
type. 
62 
associated with higher levels of unbounded persuasibility but, like P-Scale 1 and P-
Scale 2, failed to correlate significantly with the criterion. It is interesting to note 
that the JFPQ was negatively related (at a marginal level) to unbounded persuasibility 
despite the fact that items were scored such that the JFPQ should have correlated 
positively with the criterion. 10 
The correlations among the four paper-and-pencil measures of persuasibility 
(see Table 12) represent the convergent validities of each measure. It is worth noting 
that, with one exception, these scales seemed to measure largely independent 
constructs. Only the P-Scale 1 (Self-Doubt) and the JFPQ were strongly correlated. 
All other correlations suggested that P-Scale 1, P-Scale 2, the PPI, and the JFPQ 
were not measuring the same construct. These findings call into question the 
convergent validity of all paper-and-pencil measure of unbounded persuasibility. 
Although the paper-and-pencil measures failed to correlate significantly with 
unbounded persuasibility scores, there was a possibility that these measures could 
predict each of the four bounded persuasion scores, separately. To test for this 
possibility, we computed the correlations between the four paper-and-pencil measures 
and four bounded persuasion scores. Results revealed, however, that P-Scale 1 (Self-
Doubt) and P-Scale 2 (Affective Value of Attitude Change) failed to correlate with 
any of the bounded persuasion scores. Furthermore, both the PPI and the JFPQ were 
only slightly better predictors of bounded persuasion, correlating with only one of the 
bounded persuasion scores. (See Table 13 for correlations between each paper-and-
pencil measure and each bounded persuasion scores.) 
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As a follow up analysis, separate validity coefficients were computed for 
women and men. Although these analyses revealed that the correlations between 
unbounded persuasibility, P-Scale 1 (Self-Doubt) and P-Scale 2 (Reactions to Attitude 
Change) did not differ for women and men, the analyses also revealed that scores on 
both the PPI and JFPQ were more predictive for women than for men. (See Table 
14 for validity coefficients by gender.) Unlike men, women who scored higher on 
the PPI were more open to persuasion than women who scored lower on the PPL 
Moreover, w~men who scored higher on the JFPQ were less open to persuasion than 
women who scored lower on the JFPQ. This last finding is surprising because JFPQ 
scores were expected to correlate positively with persuasion. 
D. SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
The findings suggest that unbounded persuasibility is a modest personality trait; 
people who are persuaded by one message are more likely to be persuaded by 
different messages on different issues. As evidence of this, there was a significant 
correlation (I=. 21, 12 < . 025) between the amount of persuasion produced by one 
message and the amount of persuasion produced by other messages. However, the 
size of the relationship was modest and explained less than 5 % of the variance in 
bounded persuasion scores. 
The findings also suggest that predicting who will ' ~ )pen to messages and 
who will be resistant is remarkably difficult. Although women were more open to 
persuasion than men on one topic (drug testing), unbounded persuasibility could not 
65 
Table 14 
Correlations Amon~ Paper-and-Pencil Measures of Persuasibility and Unbounded 



























Notes: Correlations are in bold-faced type, and probabilities are in light-faced type. 
66 
be predicted accurately from gender, even when controlling for individual differences 
in interest in the topic. In addition, using either linear or curvilinear equations, 
individual differences in unbounded persuasibility could not be predicted from 
participants' dogmatism, social desirability, self-esteem, anxiety, or need-for-
cognition. Finally, unbounded persuasibility could not be predicted accurately from 
four paper-and-pencil scales that were designed to measure persuasibility. Scores on 
P-Scale 1 (Self-Doubt) and P-Scale 2 (Reactions to Attitude Change) were not at all 
related to unbounded persuasibility; scores on the JFPQ were (surprisingly) negatively 
related to persuasibility, but only for women; and, scores on the PPI were positively 
related to persuasibility, but again only for women. 
In the entire study, only ambiguity intolerance showed a consistent relationship 
with unbounded persuasibility: both men and women who were . intolerant of 
contradictions among their beliefs were more open to persuasion than people who 
were unbothered by contradictions. Based on these findings, we can safely conclude 
that, at this point, there are no consistently valid paper-and-pencil measures of 
persuasibility. Although people do differ in their general openness to persuasion, no 
measures seem capable of predicting these individual differences for both men and 
women. 
IV. DISCUSSION 
Research on individual differences in unbounded persuasibility is surprisingly 
rare in social psychology. Only a small number of researchers in the last 30 years 
have studied whether people differ in openness to persuasion, and what factors might 
relate to such differences. Research in persuasibility is like research in any other 
sparsely studied area: the research questions are not well integrated and the findings 
are inconclusive. 
The current study tried to add integration and conclusiveness to research on 
unbounded persuasibility by addressing three issues. First, the current study 
addressed the strength of unbounded persuasibility as a personality disposition. 
Second, the relationships between persuasibility and numerous personality variables 
were addressed. Last, the current study addressed the validity of three paper-and-
pencil scales that were designed to measure individual differences in persuasibility. 
Several conclusions can be drawn from this study. 
A. UNBOUNDED PERSUASIBILITY AS A TRAIT 
Is unbounded persuasibility strong enough to merit serious attention by attitude 
change researchers? Clearly, the evidence from this and earlier studies weighs against 
looking closer at unbounded persuasibility. Given the modest correlations among 
bounded persuasion scores in this and other studies, unbounded persuasibility might 
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not deserve serious attention. If, as this study found, approximately 5 % of the 
variance in persuasion produced by one message is related to persuasion produced by 
other messages, then researchers might be justified in ignoring persuasibility as a 
research area. 
However, there are two reasons why ignoring persuasibility might be 
premature. First, all studies of persuasibility (including this one) have found that 
people who are persuaded by one message are more likely to be persuaded by another 
message. Although the relationship is small, it has enormous implications for the 
understanding of attitude change. Even the most basic principals of persuasion might 
need to be re-evaluated in light of individual differences in persuasibility. For 
instance, a long-standing principal holds that expert sources on a topic are more 
persuasive than novice sources (cf., Aronson, Turner & Carlsmith, 1963; Hovland & 
Weiss, 1952). Individual differences in persuasibility, however, might force a new 
look at this principal to see if speakers who are novices on a topic might be as 
persuasive as expert sources when the message recipient is highly persuasible. If 
persuasibility affects even the most basic principals of persuasion, then turning our 
eyes away from unbounded persuasibility would be accepting a blind spot in our view 
of the persuasion process. 
Second, the small size of the correlation among bounded persuasion scores in 
this study might be an artifact that is peculiar to laboratory studies in general, and to 
this study in particular. The current study used a fairly homogeneous sample (i.e, 18 
and 19 year old undergraduates), and presented participants with four counter-
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attitudinal editorials. By using such a homogeneous sample, we may have reduced 
the variability of bounded persuasion scores, thereby restricting the range of the 
correlations among these scores. Moreover, and more likely, by using only counter-
attitudinal editorials, we may have restricted the range of variability among unbounded 
persuasibility scores. As shown in Table 1, the variance of unbounded persuasibility 
scores was almost 50% smaller than the variance of any of the bounded persuasion 
scores. Perhaps participants who were normally open to persuasion in their daily lives 
became unus~ally resistant to persuasion in an experimental setting that presented 
them exclusively with counter-attitudinal editorials. Basing our impressions of 
unbounded persuasibility on studies conducted in highly reactive laboratory settings 
may distort our view of unbounded persuasibility. 
B. INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCE CORRELATES OF PERSUASIBILITY 
Implicit in many theories that link personality variables to attitude change is the 
notion the personality variables will also relate to persuasibility. For example, 
Cacioppo and Petty (1982) suggest that individual differences in need-for-cognition 
should relate to individual differences in the responses (i.e., yielding) to a given 
message. However, to generalize their theory to a wide range of messages, one has 
to assume that need-for-cognition will also relate to people's responses to a variety of 
messages. The same is true of any other individual difference variable. There is a 
small, but inevitable leap from attitude change theories to persuasibility theories. 
This study found that several individual difference variables were not related 
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to unbounded persuasibility. Neither gender, dogmatism, social desirability, self-
esteem, anxiety, or need-for-cognition were related to unbounded persuasibility. 
Furthermore, these variables were only rarely related to levels of bounded persuasion. 
As shown in Table 5, only ambiguity intolerance and self-esteem were related to 
bounded persuasibility scores. 
This gloomy conclusion, however, must be tempered. Although this study 
found that many individual difference variables were unrelated to unbounded 
persuasibility (or even bounded persuasion), earlier studies have uncovered some 
pronounced relationships. For example, Cronkhite and Goetz (1971) reported that 
dogmatism correlated .40 with persuasibility, whereas the current study found that 
dogmatism correlated . 00 with persuasibility. The source of this discrepancy might 
lie in methodological differences in how the two studies operationalized persuasibility. 
Cronkhite and Goetz operationalized persuasibility by exposing participants to five 
counter-attitudinal editorials and five pro-~ttitudinal editorials, whereas the current 
study used only four counter-attitudinal editorials. If the latter method of 
operationalizing persuasibility induced unusual levels of reactance and range 
restriction, we cannot accept the blanket conclusion that individual difference vari-
ables rarely relate to persuasibility. 11 
C. PAPER-AND-PENCIL MEASURES OF PERSUASIBILITY 
In the history of social psychology, only three attempts (Janis & Field, 1959; 
Phillips, 1981; and the current study) have been made to develop paper-and-pencil 
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measures of persuasibility, and none of those attempts have succeeded. In the current 
study, only one measure -- the PPI -- showed even a modest relationship with 
persuasibility. Moreover, that relationship held only for women and was not large 
enough for us to make reasonably accurate predictions as to who was open to a variety 
of persuasive messages and who was resistant to such messages. 
The modest success of the PPI and the failure of the JFPQ, P-Scale 1 (Self-
Doubt) and P-Scale 2 (Reactions to Attitude Change) point to some future directions 
in the development of a valid paper-and-pencil measure of persuasibility. The PPI 
was built from items whose intent (to measure persuasibility) was not transparently 
obvious to participants. Using item #1 from the PPI as an example, only the most 
sophisticated participants would realize that the PPI was intended to measure 
persuasibility by asking if "the ideas which get printed nowadays are worth the paper 
they are printed _on." 
On the other hand, the JFPQ, P-Scale 1 and P-Scale 2 were built from items 
whose intents were far more transparent. These scales asked participants very directly 
a~mut their susceptibility to attitude change. For example, the JFPQ included 
questions asking participants how influenced they are by their friends, P-Scale 1 
included items that asked participants how often they are "won over" to the point of 
view of other people, and P-Scale 2 included items that asked participants how 
comfortable they feel when people try to persuade them. 
All of these "transparent" measures of persuasibility failed. In fact, the JFPQ 
tended to "backfire." People who admitted to being open to persuasion were actually 
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resistant to messages, and people who denied being susceptible were actually 
susceptible to persuasive messages. Therefore, this study suggests that future attempts 
to measure persuasibility use less transparent items. 
D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
In recent years, researchers have been casting new looks at individual 
differences in persuasion. Very few researchers, however, have looked at unbounded 
persuasibility to learn why some people are generally more open to a variety of 
messages. Given that this and earlier studies strongly suggest that unbounded 
persuasibility may be, at best, a modest contributor to individual differences in 
persuasion, unbounded persuasibility may remain in the shadows and generate very 
little future research. 
Although understandable, this would be unfortunate because of the theoretical 
importance of persuasibility. Thus, unbounded persuasibility should not remain in the 
shadows forever. Future research is needed to clarify why some people are, in fact, 
more open to messages in general than are other people. At the same time, however, 
researchers should take great care when planning future studies. Future researchers 
are advised to take extraordinary precautions when planning studies of unbounded 
persuasibility. To ensure that there is enough variance in unbounded persuasibility 
scores, researchers should avoid using homogeneous populations (such as only college 
freshman) and should not use exclusively counter-attitudinal editorials. By using more 
diverse populations and including some pro-attitudinal editorials, future researchers 
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might increase the range of persuasibility scores. 
Another recommendation for future researchers is to focus closer attention on 
bounded persuasibility. Rather than focus on unbounded persuasibility and whether 
some people can be persuaded all of the time, future researchers should focus on 
bounded persuasibility and the conditions under which some of the people can be 
persuaded some of the time. Toward that end, the functional theories can cast some 
light on why some people might be more susceptible to certain types of messages. 
Early functional theorists (Katz, 1960; Smith, Bruner & White, 1956) pointed out that 
messages will only be persuasive if they appeal to the psychological needs being 
served by particular attitudes. The more researchers know about the functions being 
served by an attitude, the more likely they will understand why some people can be 
persuaded with certain types of message whereas others are unpersuaded by those 
same messages. 
Recent research by Snyder and Debono (1987) is a good example of how 
functional theories can be applied to individual differences in bounded persuasibility. 
These investigators found that high self-monitors (people who were especially 
concerned about attaining social approval) were more persuaded by advertisements 
that stressed the social attributes of a product (e.g., the popularity to be gained 
through its use) than by advertisements that stressed a product's physical attributes 
(e.g., quality and craftsmanship). Conversely, they also found that low self-monitors 
(people who were less concerned about attaining social approval) were less persuaded 
by advertisements that stressed the product's social attributes than by advertisements 
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that stressed the product's physical attributes. These findings suggest that researchers 
should focus their attention on bounded persuasibility and the personality variables 
(such as self-monitoring) that leave people open to one kind of message, but resistant 
to other kinds of messages. 
E. SUMMARY 
After his earliest research on persuasibility, Janis (1954) envisioned that 
" ... some more or less general factors of persuasibility will be 
eventually isolated upon which accurate predictions can be made as 
to how different individuals will respond to various discrete 
communications on different topics" (p. 506). 
To date only part of that vision has been fulfilled. This study, like the few that 
preceded it, did succeed in isolating a general factor of unbounded persuasibility, 
finding that people who were persuaded by a message on one topic tended to be 
persuaded by other messages on unrelated topics. However, the strength of the 
unbounded persuasibility factor appears weaker than perhaps Janis (and the current 
author) expected. 
The second part of Janis' vision has not yet come true. Previous studies have 
not uncovered factors on which to make accurate predictions about who will resist and 
who will accept messages on different topics. With the exception of ambiguity 
intolerance, the current study also failed to find any personality variables or any 
paper-and-pencil measures of persuasibility that could predict accurately individual 
differences in unbounded persuasibility. 
The two parts of Janis' vision are not unrelated. Researchers will never be able 
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to uncover accurate predictors and measures of persuasibility until they are able to 
identify a stronger persuasibility trait. This may never happen because unbounded 
persuasibility may not be a strong personality trait. On the other hand, accurate 
predictors and measures might be uncovered if more heterogeneous populations and 
potentially less reactive methods of operationalizing persuasibility are used. This 
study cannot untangle whether unbounded persuasibility has so few predictors because 
(a) there is, in fact, only a small and unreliable relationship between levels of attitude 
change across topics, or (b) current methods artificially restrict the range of 
persuasibility scores, thereby truncating all subsequent correlations with unbounded 
persuasibility. 
As is usually the case, more research is needed. We need more careful 
research on unbounded persuasibility, particularly research that uses less reactive 
methods of operationalizing unbounded persuasibility. We also need more research 
on bounded persuasibility in order to identify the conditions that leave some people 
susceptible to some messages some of the time. 
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ENDNOTES 
1. Eagly (1981) provides another way of classifying research on individual 
differences in persuasion. She classified research as falling into one of three 
camps. First there are those who approach individual differences in persuasion 
armed with personality theories. As an example, Eagly includes in this camp 
researchers who have suggested that individual differences in persuasion are 
caused by personality differences in self-esteem. Second, there are those who 
approach persuasibility armed with attitude theories. For instance, Eagly cites 
Sherif and Hovland's (1961) social judgment theory as an example. According 
to social judgment theory, people who maintain an attitude with a wide latitude 
of acceptance will be easier to persuade than those who have narrower ranges of 
acceptance. Finally, there are those who combine both personality theories and 
attitude theo~es in an attempt to understand persuasibility. The best example 
from this camp is McGuire's (1985) theory which claims that a personality 
variable (such as self-esteem) may increase persuasion by increasing the amount 
of attention a person donates to a message, but simultaneously decrease persuasion 
by decreasing the chance that a person will accept a message. 
2. The work of Janis and Field (1959) stimulated only a handful of studies that 
assessed attitude change across multiple topics. Although these studies invariably 
compute unbounded persuasibility scores by adding together persuasion scores 
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produced by several different messages, two problems make it difficult to compare 
across studies the correlations among persuasion scores. The major problem is 
that, in general, correlations among persuasion scores have not been reported by 
most researchers (Ally, 1980; Cronkhite & Goetz, 1971; Glass et al., 1969; 
Jenks, 1965; Jones, 1976; Silverman et al., 1970; Whittaker, 1965; Whittaker & 
Meade, 1967). Another problem is that those researchers who have reported the 
correlations among persuasion scores (Epting, 1967; Lee, 1976; Touhey, 1973) 
have used such widely different techniques to induce persuasion that comparison 
among correlations is difficult. Touhey induced persuasion by having participants 
write two counter-attitudinal editorials. Using this self-persuasion technique, 
Touhey reported an unusually strong correlation of .47 between two persuasion 
scores. Epting used contrived results from two sets of opinion polls to induce 
persuasion. This technique produced a correlation between persuasion scores of 
.37. Only Lee induced persuasion by having participants read editorials on 
several topics. Using this more traditional approach, Lee found that persuasion 
scores were correlated only .14. 
3. The size of the internal consistency of unbounded persuasibility scores is based on 
correlations between attitude change scores across several topics. Although the 
exact correlations are often not reported in past research, earlier researchers have 
described modest correlations among the persuasion scores produced by different 
messages. The modest correlations among persuasion scores is reminiscent of 
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Mischel's (1984) contention that there is only modest correlations among 
behaviors that any one person produces in different situations. 
4. Rather than use all 45 items from the Need For Cognition Scale, 16 items were 
selected to serve as an abbreviated version of this scale. The items (numbers 1, 
10, 15, 16, 19, 21, 22, 23, 24, 29, 31, 32, 33, 39, 40, and 43 from the original 
scale) were selected based on the size of the item-total correlations reported in two 
studies by Cacioppo and Petty (1982, p. 123) 
5. Some additional mention should be given to the ordering of materials in the first 
and second sessions. Given the amount of effort required of participants in this 
study it was impossible to include all persuasibility and personality measures in 
a single session. Therefore, a choice was made to include in the first session only 
the attitude scales, the paper-and-pencil measures of persuasibility (i.e., the PPI, 
JFPQ, and the P-Scale) and the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale. 
The paper-and-pencil measures were purposely excluded from the second 
session because we wanted to eliminate the possibility that respondents would 
infer their general level of persuasibility from how much they changed their 
attitudes in the experimental session. If the paper-and-pencil measures were 
included in the second session, a potential self-perception bias that might have 
artificially inflated the correlation between the paper-and-pencil measures and the 
criterion of unbounded persuasibility. 
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There was, however, a disadvantage with this ordering. By completing the 
persuasibility measures in the first session, participants might have been 
forewarned of impending attitude change attempts. This forewarning might have 
led participants to bolster their attitudes before they received counter-attitudinal 
messages, thereby making them less open to persuasion. The end result might 
have been (a) that the range among unbounded persuasibility scores was restricted 
and (b) that all subsequent correlations between bounded persuasibility scores and 
any other variable were attenuated by that restricted range. 
Another point about the ordering of materials should be mentioned. With the 
exception of the P-Scale always being the first instrument in the first session, all 
other materials were randomly ordered within the sessions. That is, the PPI, 
JFPQ, and MCSD scales were randomly ordered for participants during the first 
session, and the various personality scales were randomly ordered for the second 
session. 
6. Whenever multiple items (such as item-change scores) had to be combined, items 
were averaged together rather than summed together. This strategy was selected 
to minimize the effect of missing data. If several items were summed together, 
missing data would have spuriously lowered the respondent's total "sum score," 
making them appear less affected by the message than they might have been. Of 
course, missing data could have been handled by disqualifying participants who 
had missing data. However, this strategy would have disqualified from all 
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subsequent analyses anyone who had missing data on only one item. Averaging 
items together avoided these two problems, producing more accurate scores for 
participants and retaining participants who had missing data on some items. 
Nevertheless, a participant's data was disqualified if more than 20% of the items 
being averaged were blank. 
7. It remained possible that bounded persuasion scores would be more strongly 
correlated if the effect of "issue importance" were factored out of each persuasion 
scores. It was reasoned that the more important an issue was to a participant, the 
less open to persuasion that participant would be. By affecting the size of 
bounded persuasion scores, issue importance could have affected the size of the 
correlation among persuasion scores. 
Because all subsequent analyses in this study were directly affected by the size 
of the correlation among bounded pers11asion scores, preliminary analyses were 
conducted into the effects of "issue importance" on bounded persuasion scores. 
First, the importance of each issue (at the time of the first session) was correlated 
with the level of persuasion produced by each editorial. Surprisingly, only 
nonsignificant correlations between issue importance and bounded persuasion 
scores were found [average r (283) = .034, 12=n.s.]. These correlations suggest 
that "issue importance" had virtually no effect on bounded persuasion scores and 
that "issue importance" would not affect the size of the correlations among 
bounded persuasion scores. 
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Second, the small effect of "issue importance" was factored out before 
correlating the four bounded persuasion scores. This was done by regressing each 
persuasion score on "issue importance" scores and then creating residualized 
persuasion scores. For example, each participant's "euthanasia persuasion score" 
was regressed on the importance placed on that issue, and a "residualized 
euthanasia persuasion score." After creating residualized persuasion scores for 
each issue, the correlations among these scores were then computed. Because the 
average correlation among residualized persuasion scores (r = . 20) was no different 
than the average correlation among the non-residualized persuasion scores 
(r =. 21), "issue importance" was not used as a covariate in any subsequent 
analyses. 
8. Cattell' s .S. .reflects the correspondence between factor loadings in different 
samples. The closer .S comes to 1.00, the closer the correspondence between 
factor loadings. 
9. Although the PPI consisted of three subscales, these subscales were combined 
into a total PPI score because (a) Phillips (1981) designed the PPI to be used in 
this manner, and (b) previous uses of the PPI (Phillips, 1981; Pietscher, 1984) 
combined the PPI' s three subscales into a single score. 
10. The predictive validity of each item in the P-Scale, the PPI, and the JFPQ was 
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also examined. This was done by (a) randomly splitting the total sample into 
two halves, (b) computing separately for each half of the sample the correlations 
between each item and the criterion measure of unbounded persuasibility, and (c) 
comparing the item-criterion correlations from each sample in order to see which 
items had significant item-criterion correlations in QQ!h samples. This approach, 
however, was no more successful than examining the criterion validities of total 
scale scores for the pooled sample. Only four items from the P-Scale (numbers 
24, 34, 38 and 60), one item from the PPI (number 26), and no items from the 
JFPQ had correlations greater than .10 in both samples. 
11. The problems with the restricted range of unbounded persuasibility scores might 
explain this study's overall inability to find accurate predictors of persuasibility. 
There are two potential causes of restricted range in this study; one 
methodological, and one theoretical. First, the combination of potentially reactive 
methods and a homogeneous sample may have truncated the range of unbounded 
persuasibility scores. This methodological problem might account for the lack of 
significant correlations. A second, and more theoretical possibility is that 
unbounded persuasibility scores might have regressed inward because 
persuasibility might, in fact, be only a modest personality trait. If, beyond the 
confines of the current study, the amount of persuasion produced by one message 
is not strongly related to amount of persuasion produced by other messages, a 
person's average persuasion score (i.e., unbounded persuasibility) would regress 
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toward zero. 
Given the restricted range in this study, there was some temptation to 
"correct" the correlations between unbounded persuasibility scores and other 
measures for range restriction, thereby increasing the number of significant 
predictors of persuasibility. However, correction formulas (see Alexander, 
Carson, Alliger & Carr, 1987) were not used given the important (and likely) 
theoretical possibility that unbounded persuasibility is, in fact, only a modest 
personality trait. 
APPENDIX A: 
GOALS, METHODS, AND 
FINDINGS OF PILOT STUDIES 
STUDY 1: IDENTIFYING APPROPRIATE ISSUES 
Wood and Stangor (in press) suggest that the more ambiguous the issue, the 
more likely one's personality will affect the acceptance or rejection of a message. 
Therefore, the goal of the first pilot study was to identify social issues about which 
undergraduates felt ambivalently and could just as easily support one view as support 
another. To accomplish this, 40 introductory psychology students read statements on 
32 controversial topics. For example, participants were shown a statement claiming 
that hospital patients with AIDS should be isolated on a separate AIDS unit. 
Participants were than given 15 seconds to access their reasons, if any, for supporting 
each statement (e.g., to think of reasons to support isolating AIDS patients), and 15 
seconds to access their reasons for opposing each statement. Participants were then 
asked to use 5-points scale to indicate how ~sily (1 =difficultly, 5 =easily) supporting 
beliefs came to mind, and how easily opposing beliefs came to mind. 
This procedure made it possible to identify issues for which undergraduates 
could access supporting beliefs as easily as opposing beliefs. Although equal access 
of both supporting and opposing beliefs could arise from a host of factors (such as 
familiarity with the issue), we reasoned that equal access to both supporting and 
opposing beliefs was one sign of ambivalence in attitudes. 
Based on this logic, five out of the original 32 issues were selected for further 
use because participants could just as easily generate supporting and opposing beliefs. 
Specifically, for each of the five issues, the mean accessibility of supporting beliefs 
· did not differ significantly from the mean accessibility of opposing beliefs, all two-
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tailed t's < 1.63, 12's > .10. The selected issues involved the use of active 
euthanasia, marriage for Catholic priests, mandatory drug testing, open admissions 
policies at public universities, and increased government support for the homeless. 
All other issues were rejected because the mean accessibility of supporting beliefs did 
differ significantly from the mean accessibility of opposing beliefs. 
STUDY 2: IDENTIFYING SALIENT BELIEFS 
The goal of the second study was to generate a pool of cogent arguments that 
could be used to change a person's attitudes toward euthanasia, married priests, open 
admissions, drug testing, housing shelters. To accomplish this, 29 introductory 
psychology students wrote down the various beliefs they had about each of the five 
experimental topics. Participants spent three minutes writing down beliefs that 
supported a particular position on an issue (e.g. beliefs that favor the use of 
euthanasia) and three minutes writing down beliefs that opposed that position (e.g., 
beliefs that argued against euthanasia). After generating a series of supporting and 
opposing beliefs toward each issue, participants evaluated the cogency of each belief 
by assigning it a grade from A (a very persuasive belief) to F (a very unpersuasive 
belief). 
Although no quantitative analyses were performed on the responses, it was 
possible to identify the most common and cogent beliefs that undergraduates held 
about the five issues. After reading and sorting through the responses, many of the 
underlying beliefs were later incorporated into ten editorials. Some of these beliefs 
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were used in editorials that favored euthanasia, married priests, open admissions, drug 
testing, and housing shelters (referred to at "Pro" editorials), whereas other beliefs 
were incorporated into editorials that opposed these issues (referred to as "Con" 
editorials). 
STUDY 3: PERSUASIVENESS OF EDITORIALS 
After the second pilot study, several Likert-style statements and semantic-
differential pairs were devised to measure attitudes toward euthanasia, married priests, 
open admissions, housing shelters, and drug testing. (See Appendix B for copies of 
all items.) To assess the reliability and validity of these measures, introductory 
psychology students responded to each item. Table 15 lists the internal consistencies 
of the Likert-style and the semantic differential items, as well as the correlation 
between the two scales for each of the experimental issues. As can be seen, all items 
were internally consistent and the Likert-style and semantic-differential scales were 
strongly related. 
Another goal of this pilot study was to evaluate the editorials (see Appendix C). 
Specifically, we needed to ensure that the "pro" and "con" editorials for each issue 
successfully manipulated attitudes without using widely different styles. To evaluate 
the editorials, participants were randomly assigned to read either a "pro" or "con" 
editorial on each of the five topics. They then rated each editorial on 21 different 
stylistic dimensions and completed the Likert-style and semantic-differential scales. 
Table 16 lists the t-values for the differences between the "pro" and "con" editorials 
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Table 15 
Coefficient Alphas for. and Pearson Correlations Between Likert-style and Semantic-
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Table 16 
Values oft for Differences Between Five "Pro" and "Con" Editorial Alon& Two 
Attitude Measures and 21 Style Dimensions 
~XPERIMEN'.IAL ~QEI~S 
El E2 E3 E4 ES 
Likert Scale 2.74 4.47 6.30 5.00 3.56 
Semantic Differ. 2.72 3.04 6.04 5.06 1. 78 
EDITORIAL ... 
Persuasiveness .62 1. 81 -1.63 2.49* 5.18** 
Powerfulness - .05 1.25 - .44 1.50 4.61** 
Convincingness 1.43 2.43* -1.45 3.12** 4.34** 
Logicality - .31 1. 76 -1.04 3.37** 2.80* 
Emotionality 1.85 -1.52 3.71** -1.09 2.31* 
Truthfulness - .04 1.05 - .98 2.51* 3.98** 
Simplicity .39 .74 2.11* - .52 - .19 
Clarity - .94 .63 -1.45 .oo 3.06** 
Bias - .76 - .59 1.34 -2.19* .77 
Fairness .17 2.21* - .50 1.99* 2.49* 
One-sidedness - .so -1.67 - .59 -1.36 - .24 
Humorousness - .08 .19 .52 - .26 - .47 
Interestingness 1.04 - .05 1.63 .51 3.49** 
No. of arguments - .31 .82 .83 1.29 .12 
CONCLUSION ... 
Clarity .58 .69 -1. 21 .64 3.61** 
Strength .80 .76 - .4S 1.S2 4.4S** 
Implicitness .so 1. 26 1.17 .57 - .18 
WRITER ... 
Expertise .85 - .22 .13 -1.70 -1.62 
Trustworthiness 
-
.86 .41 - .85 .47 .98 
Powerfulness -1. 23 - .12 - .65 - .30 1.69 
Likability .34 .38 - .61 - .44 2.16* 
El represents the two editorials on active euthanasia. 
E2 represents the two editorials on marriage for priests. 
E3 represents the two editorials on open admissions policies. 
E4 represents the two editorials on mandatory drug testing. 
ES represents the two editorials on more aid for the homeless. 
H.QTE: Items composing the Likert scales and semantic differ-
entials were recoded so that higher values represent more support 
for the experimental topics. 
Positive (negative) t-values indicate the "Pro" ("Con") 
editorial was rated higher than the "Con" ("Pro") editorial on a 
given dimension. 
** R<.01, two-tailed 
* R<.OS, two-tailed 
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on the two attitude scales and the 21 different dimensions. As can be seen, the 
editorials on four of the five issues did manipulate attitudes in the intended direction, 
without differing along the majority of style dimensions. Only the editorials dealing 
with shelter for the homeless differed in style, and had to be dropped from further 
use. In all, this third pilot study ensured 1) that attitude measures for this proposal 
were internally consistent and highly correlated, and 2) that the editorials were, in 
fact, persuasive. 
STUDY 4: PRELIMINARY ANALYSES OF THE P-SCALE. 
The last pilot study began the preliminary analysis of the P-Scale. In this last 
pilot study, 51 introductory psychology students were presented with a preliminary 
version of a newly devised persuasibility scale (see Appendix D). Results revealed 
that the P-Scale had sufficient internal consistency to merit additional research, 
coefficient alpha=. 85. 
APPENDIX B: 
ATTITUDE SCALES 
Attitudes Toward Euthanasia Scale 
ACTIVE EUTHANASIA 
Recently the medical profession and religious leaders have 
debated the use of active eu~hanasia where doctors 
actually help terminally ill patients die by counseling the 
patients and then giving them a lethal dose of medication. 
Many people support active euthanasia and see it as a 
necessary "mercy killing". others, however, oppose active 
euthanasia, saying it is not merciful. 
We are interested in discovering what people know about 
active euthanasia and how they feel about it. Please answer 
the questions on this and the following page. 
1. Before today, how much had you 
heard about active euthanasia? 
2. How important is this topic 
to you before today? 
!=none 
2=very little 




3=hard to decide 
4=important 
5=very important 
We would like to know your opinion about active euthanasia, 
even if you have heard very little about it. Please read 
the statements on the following page and indicate how 
strongly you disagree or agree with each. Please use the 7-





VERY DISAGREE AGREE VERY 












There are good reasons to support active 
(physician-assisted) euthanasia. 
There are good reasons to oppose active 
(physician-assisted) euthanasia. 
All things considered, the reasons for 
opposing active euthanasia are stronger 
than the reasons for supporting it. 
Physicians should be banned from helping 
a terminally-ill patient die, even if the 
patient wants to die. 
If both the physician and patient agree, 
physicians should help a terminally ill 
patient die. 
It is a doctor's duty to prevent death 
whenever possible. 
Active euthanasia goes against the goals 
of the medical profession. 
Terminally ill patients have the right 
to end their suffering. 
The patient's wish to die should outweigh 
all other consideration. -
In many cases, active euthanasia is the 
only humane thing to do. 
1 2 3 
l 2 3 
1 2 3 
1 2 3 
1 2 3 
1 2 3 
1 2 3 
1 2 3 
1 2 3 
1 2 3 
4 5 6 7 
4 5 6 7 
4 5 6 7 
4 5 6 7 
4 5 6 7 
4 5 6 7 
4 5 6 7 
4 5 6 7 
4 5 6 7 
4 5 6 7 
THERE ARE 14 PAIRS OF ADJECTIVES BELOW THAT CAR BE USED TO DESCRIBE 
YOUR FEELINGS ABOUT ACTIVE EUTHANASIA. FOR EACH OF THESE 14 PAIRS, 
PLACE AN •x• IN THE SPACE THAT BEST REFLECTS YOUR FEELINGS ABOUT 
ACTIVE EUTHANASIA. 
ACTIVE EUTHANASIA IS ••. 
1. Good : : : : : : Bad 
--
-- -- -- --
-- --2. Valuable : : : : : : Worthless 
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- Uni•portant 3. I•portant : : : : : : 




-- -- -- -- --5. Needed : : : : : : Not Needed 
--
-- -- -- -- -- --6. Fair : : : : : : Unfair 
-- -- -- -- -- -- --7. Unethical : : : : : : Ethical 
-- -- -- -- -- -- --8. Inhwaane : : : : : : Humane 
-- -- -- -- -- -- --9. Cruel : : : : : : Merciful 
-- -- -- -- -- -- --Misguided 10 : : : : : 
--
: Well Thought out 
-- -- -- -- -- --11. Foolish : : : : : : Wise 
--
-- -- -- -- -- --12. A Proble• : : : : : : An Answer 
-- -- -- -- -- -- --13. HURTS HELPS 
MEDICINE : MEDICINE. 
-- --14. Within a outside a 
------ patient's patient's 
riqhts . : : : riqhta 
--
. 
-- -- -- -- --
Attitudes Toward Married Priests Scale 
MARRIED PRIESTS 
Recently many Catholics have ar<JUed about whether priests 
should be allowed to get married and have children. Some 
believe that allowing priests to marry would be good for the 
Church. However others, believing that it will harm the 
Church, have argued that the Church should keep its long 
tradition of Wllllarried priests. 
We are interested in discovering 
the debate over married priests and 
married priests. Please answer the 
the following page. 
1. Before today, how much had you 
heard about allowing priests 
to marry? 
2. How iaportant is this topic 
to you, today? 
what people know about 
how people feel about 
questions on this and 
l=none 
2=very little 




J=hard to decide 
4=important 
5=very important 
We would like to know your op1m.on about iaarriage in the 
Catholic priesthood, even if you have heard very little 
about this issue. Please read the statements on the 
following page and indicate how strongly you disagree or 
agree with each. Please use the 7-point scale on the top of 




VERY DISAGREE AGREE VERY 
Strongly Strongly DISAGREE NEITHER AGREE Strongly Strongly 
1---------2---------3---------4---------5---------6----------7 
1. There are good reasons to support marriage 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
for Catholic priests. 
2. There are good reasons to oppose marriage 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
for Catholic priests. 
3. All things considered, the reasons to 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
support marriage for priests are ~tronger 
the reasons to oppose such marriages. 
4. Marriage for priests probably goes against 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
the teachings in the Bible. 
5. I can see very few reasons for allowing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
priests to marry. 
6. It would help the Catholic church if 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
priests were allowed to marry. 
7. It would hurt Catholic church-goers if 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
priests were allowed to marry. 
8. It would hurt the profession of the 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
priesthood if priests could :marry. 
9. The Church should not break a long-standing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
tradition of single priests. 
10. The tradition of single prief?tS is outdated. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
THERE ARE 14 PAIRS OF ADJECTIVES BELOW THAT CAN BE USED TO DESCRIBE 
YOUR FEELINGS ABOUT MARRIAGE FOR CATHOLIC PRIESTS. FQR EACH OF THESE 
14 PAIRS, PLACE AM •x• IN THE SPACE THAT BEST REFLECTS YOUR FEELINGS 
ABOUT MARRIAGE FOR CATHOLIC PRIESTS. 
MARRIAGE FOR CATHOLIC PRIESTS IS ... 
1. Good : : : : : : Bad 
-- -- -- -- -- -- --2. Valuable : : : : : : Worthless 
-- -- -- -- --
-- -- Uni:aportant 3. I•portant : : : : : : 
-- -- -- -- --
--
--4. Helpful : : : : : : Harw.f ul 
--
-- -- -- -- -- --5. Needed : : : : : : Not Needed 
-- -- --
-- -- -- -- Unfair 6. Fair . : : : : : . 
-- -- -- -- -- -- --7. Unethical : : : : : : Ethical 
-- -- -- -- -- -- --8. Inhwaane : : : : : : Hwaape 
-- -- -- -- -- -- --9. Cruel : : : : : : Merciful 
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- Well 10 Misguided : : : : : : Thought out 
-- -- -- -- -- -- --11. Foolish : : : : : : Wise 
-- -- -- -- -- -- --12. A Proble• : : : : : : An Answer 
-- -- -- -- -- -- --
13. HURTS THE HELPS THE 
CHURCH : : : : : : CHURCH. 
-- -- -- -- -- -- --14. Within a outside a 
priest's priest's 
rights . : : : : : rights 
--
. 
-- -- -- -- -- --
Attitudes Toward Open Admissions Scale 
OPEN ADMISSIONS AT PUBLIC UNIVERSITIES 
One issue that is frequently debated by education experts is 
whether publicly funded universities, like the University of 
Illinois, should admit all. Illinois residents who apply. 
This •open door policy• is controversial because there would 
be no requirements (such as acceptable high school grades or 
standard test scores) to enter public universities. 
supporters of the policy argue that publicly funded schools 
should accept anyone in the public who wants to attend. 
Critics argue that state universities would becoae over-
crowded and public education would suffer. 
We are interested in discovering what people know about 
open admissions and how they feel about it. Please answer 
the questions on this and the following page. 
1. Before today, how much had you 
heard about open admissions? 
2. How iaportant is this topic 
to you, today? 
l=none 
2=very little 




3=hard to decide 
4=iaportant 
5=very i•portant 
We would like to know your opinion about open ad.Jlissions at 
publicly funded universities, even if you know very little 
about it. Please read the stateaents on the following page 
and indicate how strongly you disagree or agree with each. 
Please use the 7-point scale on the top of the following 




VERY DISAGREE AGREE VERY 
Strongly Strongly DISAGREE NEITHER AGREE Strongly Strongly 
1---------2---------3---------4---------5---------6----------7 
1. There are good reasons to support the 
•open aditissions policy.• 
l 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. There are good reasons to oppose the 
•open aditissions policy.• 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. All things condisered, the reasons for 
supporting •open admissions• are stronger 
than the reasons for opposing it. 
l 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. State universities should adopt ~ •open 
admissions policy.• 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. There is very little to gain by adopting 
the •open admissions policy.• 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. Many benefits would.come if the •open 
admissions policy• was adopted. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. Open admissions would make a mess of state 
universities. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. State universities would suffer if open 
admissions is adopted. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9. Public universities must keep some selec-
tive standards when deciding who to a<hlit. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10. The state owes each citizen a chance at 
higher education, even citizens who will 
probably fail. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
THERE ARE 14 PARIS OF ADJECTIVES BELOW THAT CAM BE USED TO DESCRIBE 
YOUR FEELINGS ABOUT OPEN ADMISSIONS AT PUBLIC UNIVERSITIES. FOR EACH 
OF THESE 14 PAIRS, PLACE AN •x• IN THE SPACE THAT BEST REFLECTS HOW 

































: : : : : : Worthless 
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Attitudes Toward Drug Testing Scale 
MANDATORY DRUG TESTING 
In the past few years there has been much debate over the 
use of mandatory on-the-job drug tests for employees. Those 
who favor these tests argue that drug testing will help keep 
drugs and accidents out of the work place. Those who oppose 
drug testing argue that the tests are inaccurate and an 
invasion of privacy. 
We are interested in discovering what people know about 
aandatory drug testing and how they feel about it. Please 
answer the questions on this and the following page. 
1. Before today, how much had you 
heard about mandatory drug tests? 








J=hard to decide 
4= important 
5=very important 
We would like to know your opinion about mandatory drug 
tests for employees of private companies, even if you have 
heard very little about this topic. Please read the state-
11ents on the fol lowing page and indicate how strongly you 
disagree or agree with each. Please use the 7-point scale 




VERY DISAGREE AGREE VERY 
Strongly Strongly DISAGREE NEITHER AGREE Strongly Strongly 
1---------2---------3---------4---------5---------6----------7 
1. There are good reasons to oppose mand-
atory drug tests of private employees. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. There are good reasons to support mand-
atory drug tests of private employees. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. The reasons for opposing mandatory drug 
test are stronger than the reasons for 
supporting drug tests. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. Employees should be required to take 
regular on-the-job drug tests. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. An employee's private drug habits are 
NOT the business of the employer. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. Drugs .are so dangerous that the company's 
right to a safe and drug-free enviroruaent 
outweighs the rights of the employee. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. Drug tests provide an accurate way to see 
if employees are taking illegal drugs. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. Drug tests provide ethical ways to see if 
employees are taking illegal drugs. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9. Drug tests provide a good way to prevent 
drug abuse in the work place. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10. There ought to be a law that protects 
employees from mandatory drug tests. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
THERE ARE 13 PAIRS OF ADJECTIVES BELOW THAT CAN BE USED TO DESCRIBE 
YOUR FEELINGS ABOUT MANDATORY, ON-THE-JOB DRUG TESTING. FOR EACH OF 
TlfESE 13 PAIRS, PLACE AH •x• IN THE SPACE THAT BEST REFLECTS HOW YOU 
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Editorial Supporting Active Euthanasia 
IHlSE LIFE IS IT, ANYWAY? 
A recent medical article 
made plblic an ethical dilenna 
faced bi/ more and DJre doctore · 
and their patients. '!he 
dilama inYolved active euthan-
•ia or the merciful killing 
of a terminally ill patient bi/ 
her doctor. In the article, a 
cancer patient asked her ~ 
doctor to help her "end it, 
now," to atq> her endless pain 
and hopeless suffering with a 
deadly injectim. 'lhe physic-
ian agreed and the. patient 
died within mimtes. 
Should doctors actively 
participate in euthanasia? 
Shculd Ne allow doctora and 
patients to plan and carry out 
mercy killings? Al thoogh 
active euthanasia is widely 
pw:ticed in Hollan!, the 
Allerican Medical Aaeociatim 
(Na) and -t of 1 ts lll!!llbers 
stard fimly against phyaician-
-isted euthanasia. 
ait lll.1f.PJl"t tor active 
eutlwaaia is just as atrcmg. 
'Iha federal courts, loerican 
Bar Ael9oc1atim, and bo-
th.1rde of the plblic feel the 
ti. hM o::ae for active 
euthanasia. 
'!he natim'a legal cxmmn-
ity hM recently decided that 
patients taYe the right to 
control their lives and their 
deaths. In the past, the AK\ 
Ima OYerlookad the rights of 
their patients, and c.lallrled 
that a doctor's decisiai to 
laeep patients alive - and 
-=aetims in pa.in - outweigh 
patients' rights to control 
their lives. Fortunately, 
federal c:ourts have recently 
ruled that the rights and 
wishes of dying patients 
outweigh the decisions of the 
medical profesaim. 
'Iha natiai '• i.. mkm'a 
va new fom!ng atrict rul• 
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to control the uae of active 
eutmnaaia. With strict legal 
controls, active euthanasia 
will be very different ttan 
either suicide or llll'del'. A 
patient's request to die can 
c:rlly be granted Nlll!ll the 
patient is psychologically 
cxnpetent; llllell t'NO qualified 
doctors agree the patient will 
die within six 1a1tha: and 
Nlien thoae doctors agree to 
help the patient die. 'lhe 
patient's wish is the critical 
factor. Paaily, doctors. and 
priests can advise the patient, 
but the patient ..t Mira the 
ultimte decisiai. And. 
that'• the May it ehould be. 
Patient ehculd be in control 
of their final days. 
lwn WlY doctors DCM 
recognize the need for active 
euthanasia. More and m, 
ecience is deuelq>ing the 
tedn>lcgy to prolong life 
beycnS our wildest ~. 
Bc:N!vel', the ~ of tech-
nology haw becale the night-
mares of patients and their 
tailiee. Mlllc:h1ne8 9llt'f prolcmg 
life, brt often it is a life 
of unrelenting pain and .utter-
ing. W1 th all the best inten-
tim, the medical profeaeim 
hM created a e1ttatial that 
it ..t now deal with. 
A9 tec:mology grcae, the 
call for active eutmnaaia 
prcbably grow. TNo-thirda of 
the plblic already 9'ffXJl ta 
active euthanasia t.aa:we ·they 
are afraid that rather than 
die naturally they are going 
to be kept alive bi/ Nell-
meaning physicians to the 
point tobere they are no lcmger 
in control of their a1nde or 
bodies. 1h1s fear is real. 
More ttan 10,000 patients in 
this country are m.intained in 
a perJlllUll!llt vegetative state 
at a yearly c:cat of $12S,OOO 
eecll. Ill llw Jn 111.,. ~ 
patients aistruat the mtiw 
ot physic.imw ~ order ~ 
aive, and hcpel- lif~ 
system, and then aern the 
bill to the patient'• f-.tly. 
Trust in Mdicine can be 
restored if doctors help 
patients with difficult deci-
sicns, rather t:i.n ignore 
their final wishes. 
Dealing with death will 
not be easy for doctors, and 
mny doctors will eay "Me've 
never been in the tudnees of 
killing• II To that - 981: 
reply that "you've never been 
in the busineaa of prolcmging 
suffering, either." A doctor'• 
buaineaa is to help patients. 
At time, the beet my and 
cnly i.- tay to help • 
dying patient is to help that 
patient die. 
Active euthamsia cm 
also help the sur.riwrs, the 
fmily hits ~ suffer with 
emecoe '• tenWal il.lmm. A 
Los Angel• mn shared his 
suffering with -· 1hree ~ ago his •1 ~ld wife 
- dying of cancer. Ber 
pain, be recalls. .._ tz d-
~ and the k1dls and I tere 
hcpeleee. Nit diacuss !~ ti1at 
to do if the pain becme 
unbearable and • didn't cxme 
to any o::inclusiCDI. Birt, if 
llhe lm Mlmd - to help her 
die, I ..t certainly tOlld 
have helped. I N:JU.ld have 
dcne anything, regard}- of 
the oonaequences. And the 
oonaequences Nel'I!, of c::ourae, 
that I would have been gu.11 ty 
at the very least of aiding 
am abetting a suicide, if not 
Nn"Se. ~ f-.ily's suffering 
N:JU.ld tave reec:hed a new low." 
Ne umerstan:! the wll-
M8l'ling .:rtive of thcae tG> 
CRXl89 active euthanasia, but 
patients and their fail1• 
ehculd not be forced to suffer. 
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Editorial Opposing Active Euthanasia 
HEVER GIVE UP af YtxJR PATIENTS 
A recent medical article 
mde public an ethical dill!lllDIS 
faced by more and D:lre doctors 
ard their patients. '1'he 
dilemma involved active euthan-
asia or the merciful killin;J 
of a te.nainally ill patient by 
her doctor. In the article, a 
cancer patient asked her young 
doctor to "end it, now," to 
stq> her pain and suffer1ng 
with a deadly injection. Ber 
doctor agI eed and the patient 
d,ied within ainutee. 
Should doctors actively 
participate in euthanasia? 
Shoo.lei gouennenta and hoep-
i ta.la allow patients and 
doctors to plan and cany out 
Dl!rC'f killings? '1'he young 
physician and thoae tft:> llUppOrt 
active euthanasia obviCQSly 
feel that a patient has the 
right to die and endure no 
lllOl'e pain. Purther, aupportera 
claia that death 1a often the 
only merciful re&9pCl8! and 
that a physician ab:Ju.ld zespet.."1: 
a patient'• desperate wish to 
die. 
'1'he argments for active 
euthanasia, haire..'9r, aourx! 
better the 1- they are 
exaained. 11'*1 the Amric:an 
·Medical Association (AMl) 
clceely exaa1ned active euthan-
asia it found saDe fatal 
flae. 
Doctors take an oath to 
heal and a vow to respect the 
wishes of their patients. It 
the patient wishes to take no 
medication, a doctor aJSt 
Iespect that wish. If a 
patient does not tent to be 
kept alive by respirators and 
intravenous feeding', the choice 
of the patient BJSt prevail. 
Doctors can never legally or 
mlly treat a patient tft:> 
toants no treatment. If the 
patient asks, the hand of 
healin;J can be wi thdracl. 
But. the AMl Aid the 
hand of healin;J can neuer be 
replac:ed with the hand of 
death. Ro •tter tiihat the 
request, a doctor a.t never 
intentionally cause a patient· 
to die. 'ftlat 1e •imply not a 
doctor's role. '1'here ia a 
Mn"ld of difference betueen not 
treat1ng aaneooe tft:> tents no 
treablent' and physically and 
deliberately eming the life a 
patimt tft:> Nants to die. 
1heee tMD Nll'lda ahollld neuer 
be cmtused. 
1h1e does not mMll that 
doctors ehould etan:I by mt 
Natch patients suffer. As 
lllCh - doctore ehould prewmt 
death, they ehculd also prevent 
suffering. Dr. Stewn Mil•, 
a mted ethical specialist frca 
the tbiverai ty of adcago says 
that pain CCl'ltrolling drugs 
are tao oftm owrrlooklld 
during motional t1-. 
tbSenl drugs are new ao good 
that patients can literally 
sleep through their pain. 
Miles eays that CCl'ltrollin;J 
pain in tenlinally ill patients 
1e no prcblea: the probl• 1e 
•one ot physician ignm•ance. • 
8ecaUl9e mny physiciml8 do not 
knew hew to CCl'ltrol pain, they 
NIUlgly beliew that pain 
camot be CCl'ltrolled. 'ftlrough 
ignorance, they see euthanasia 
as the only tey out. '1'h1e 1e 
a deadly aistake that can be 
avoided if active eutlmlasia 1e 
banned. 
Allowing active euthanasia 
is likely to op!!l'l a Pandora's 
Bax of trooblee that Ne my 
never be able to clOBe. 
First, there are legal trcAlb--
les. Jlw.t will be the legal 
c:oosequences of doctors tft:> 
agree to help a peracm die? 
Will the doctor be an accaap-
lic:e in a crime? lbat if the 
diagnosis - ~ and the 
patient CXJU.ld have really 
surviwd? Ia the doc:tar 
respcx•ible for a wroogful 
death? 
Next, there are psycho-
logical problem. Ewrl it a 
doctor facee no legal prcbl-. 
lcnalfingly injecting a patient 
with a lethal doae is bound to 
came stress amcmg already 
CMtr-Stresseti doctors. Not 
all doctors will sulter, but 
mny will. 
Pina.Uy, there are aocial 
problem. If active euthanasia 
is allared, it is safe to 
-- that many desperate 
patients will aalc to die. In 
tlm, llCtiw eutt.maia my 
becme the nora. It that eYm' 
hllA*• - my KN'9 fral ml 
·~ that recagn.1.w the 
right to die to a dartc climate 
Jn *ich • patient feels the 
abl.lgaticlft Cll' mty to die. If 
that w bappem, actiw 
eut:hmaeia will c::auae m 
.uttering that it could eYe?' 
cure. 
'lb!re are no sillple 
--·tor the probl-
ra1aed in Mdicine. 'Dll9 
probl• of actiw euthanasia 
1a no different. sw.i ~ 
Jnmt religioue echolarll 
c:U.agree CMm" the mli ty ot 
euthanasia. !i:JNevmo, until 
there is abeolutely no debate 
CJVlel' eutlwlasia, phymiciana 
-- 8tay ~ fral helpiDJ 
patients die. 
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Editorial Supporting Marriage for Priests 
A debate is rising !!I!!!!! 
in the Catholic OlUrcb aboUt 
the priesthood. '1'he debate is 
rising because the m:aber of 
young men entering aeminariee 
is drcwlng, the JUllber of 
priests is shrinking, and • a 
result the quality of pastoral 
eervice is tested • too few 
men are spread tao tar. 
1'lere are, no doubt mny · 
cauaea far these probl-. ~ 
cause is the aurc:h'• stand cm 
mrriage for prieeta. Dcubte 
about marriage in the priest-
hocd are not new. b' cent-
uries theolog1- haw argued 
that requiring yamg men to 
refuae wivea and taailiee in 
amvice ot God my pm ..iy 
devtJut men --t fraa the . 
amvice of God. 
'DUa~ is not 
w1 thart its critics. ~ 
tilO ~ clerical .arriagee 
argue that the ec::ripturm 
prewnt it, the t:rad1 tlcms of 
the Omrch ~ it' and that 
it will interfere with the 
bcn1 betueen a priest and his 
pariah. 
li:INl!Yer, mrriage for 
catholics does baYe .upp:rt in 
the ecripturea: it does have a 
long t:raditicm in the Omrch: 
am it is a eemible t8'f to 
1llp'CYe the Qm'Ch and 1lllpl'CM9 
the bcn1 between a priest and 
hie pariah. 
'1'he evidence. 
• MARRIAG! AND 'l1IB APOS'lt.lS 
Miily Catholics beliew that 
the Apostles never mrried and 
that their celibacy eet a 
p1oecedi!nt far an umarried 
priesthood. 'Dl1s is not the 
c=-. Sane ap:ietlee Mere 
mrried, others Mere not. 
J'Urthenllore, one ot the celib-
ata 11pC19tlee, Paul in the 
l'Jrst Corin~ 7:2, deferded 
mrriagee at large Nlll!!ll stating 
that 11each mil ehculd baYe h1a 
CJlCl w1 fe and each t«llell her 
OlCl blabend." It is bud to 
reccnc:ile celibate Paul'• 
eupport of marriage w1 th the 
Omrch'• current doctrine of 
an umarried priesthood. 
• MARRIAGE AND PRIISTS. 
Mmy Catholic:e also believe 
that t!lllt Catholic aurc:h baa 
newr allOMed priests to 
mny. Rot eo. To the eur-
prae of mirf'f. the aurc:h 
allCINl!d clerical mrriagee for 
CNer 1000 years! '!he •jority 
of priesta Mere mrried mtil 
1139 .nm the C2mrc:b dmlged 
i ta policy' farbidd1ftJ prieste 
the - rights to marry that 
are offered to pariahicnmw. 
"1y the change in 11397 
surprisingly' the ct.nge -
not for ecriptural reu rm. 
Rather' the t:rad1 tJm dmlged 
to -- the <hJ1"Ch fit the 
epiri tual needs ot the day. 
In 1139 influential catholics 
believed that p:IY81"ty and 
•lf-suft'erlng .... aymb:>la ot 
deYoticn, and no acts aymb:>l-
1.zed dewtim m thm c:elJ-
l:ecy and ieolaticn fraa mr-
riage. Catholics, in 1139, 
d nded that priests not 
.any. '1he <hJ1"Ch m. follOMed 
that wish for CN9l" 800 years. 
art today mrJV Catholica 
and priesta are asking the 
ChJrCh to c:hmge again and to 
mke celibacy and mrriage an 
opticm rather than a require-
ment. N1Y'1 1'lere are be> 
reae ce•. 
'1'he first is Jmelicate 
but ..t be raised. Parced 
celibacy leads .any priests 
into eexml •inl lilm Glltery. 
Ro mn should be require:! to 
bec:cme celibate if he does not 
have the strength for it. If 
farced, he 'llllfl struggle in 
vain, and he 'llllfl ec:armlize 
the dmrc:h. Celibacy an! 
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marriage -t both be optiarw 
for prieet8. not requ..irementa. 
Seccni, marriage 1n the 
priesth:Xld gets support frc:a 
the w1adcm ot Paul tilho ( 1n 
T1-rthy 3:1-12) encouraged 
priests to mny Nll!n he noted 
that •tor it a mn does not 
knew hew to mnage his CNl 
hcuaehold, hew can he care tor 
God's house?" A priest tilho 
c:mi experience the laue and 
probleaa of a f.Uly can 
better care for God's hcuse. 
A priest ~ can mrry can 
9tarx! with his parJah.imera 
and their failies rather ttmn 
9tarx! isolated frc:a thm. 
It the amrch updates ita 
Nlee an IBl'l'iage and alloe a 
priest to c::hocae bebleen 
mrr!age and celibacy - an 
option that 1a offered to all 
other catholics - thm the 
prieetb:xx! will becale m 
~!ng to ~ catholim 
and the Omrch will be tree to 
reep:ind to the spiritual needs 
ot our age rather than the 
Olrtdated needs ot C8ltur1• 
i:-t· 
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Editorial Opposing Marriage for Priests 
A debate is rising in the 
catholic churdl atxiut the 
priesthood. '1be detete is 
rising because the maber of 
young llll!!n enterinJ 9ellinaries 
is c!roR>ing. the nmber of 
priests has been shr1nking, 
and as a result the quality of 
pastoral service has been 
Mel8la!ned as too few llll!!n are 
spreed too far. 
Sane people believe that 
the <2Jurc::h' a stand en arriage 
for priests is the cause of 
the problem. 'Dll!"f argue that 
requiring young men to aac:ri-
fic:e marriage and t'-.ily in 
eeivice of God my pl8h mny 
devart 181 ~ frca the 
priesthood. To eolw th1a 
problea acae people are asking 
that priests be allaed to 
mrry. Allc:Ming priests to 
mrry, 90 the arg\m!!nt gees. 
will refill the -.inaries 
with mell de"Joted to do God I 8 
tCldc, and will rej\M!nate the 
Qmrch. 
'ftl1s ~t. haiill!Yer, 
i.. acae probl-. To begin 
with, it is too easy to p>int 
to the shrinking -.lnaries 
md cax:l\Xle that the prcbl• 
c::c- from the Qmoch and the 
edicts ca mrriage. In fact, 
much of the decline in aminary 
enrol1-nts ~ sillply 
because the "Baby Bom" genera-
tion has graci up. With fewer 
ycung men around today, there 
are fewer young men to enter 
the seminaries this year. A 
new ruling ca mrriage in the 
priesth::iod will not change 
this situaticn, and will not 
refill the seminaries. 
Even if mrriage in the 
priesth::iod could inc: HH the 
IUlber of priests, the Omrch 
llh:Wd not change 1 ts histor-
ical p:ieitian. 'ftw 1 IMCl18 
are ma/· 
• BIBLICAL '1'BACHDIB • 
First, Olriat mde it clear 
that the Apostles should not 
divide their devotim. At the 
Last 9'lfP!%'. Christ told the 
Apostles, "Cale follow Me! 
Leave all th1J99, and everycne 
N10 has left h:Jase, or brother, 
or sister, or father, or 
.:>ther, or wife, or children 
for My sake shall receive a 
Blndredfold.• Pollc:Ming Ilia 
CXlllDiUld, priests have alttay8 
been the 5 !llgll!l"S and ~ 
eentatiwa of God. Par centur-
ies, thoee N10 have apread 
God'. Jbrda have aleo lived "' 
nioee Jbrda. Tena of thoosard9 
of priests, a:rir:s and mm 
have mrried the Qmrch and no 
aw elae. .1cm the Baptist, 
Peter and Paul sacrificed 
marriage tar God. In tact, 
all the Apostles, except aw, 
aac:rif iced mrriage in devoticn 
to God. 'Die ally Apostle to 
IBl"l'Y tel9 Judas. 
• PAR'l'-TDBPRIES'. ---1-~ • 
Being a priest _.. being 
first, last, and al.yB a 
1~ ! e E!llti Uva of God ~ 
8er'.ll!S all people, and aer..wa 
all people equally. It is 
hard to deny that the d 1:ds 
of a wife and haily tD1ld 
interfere with a priest:'• 
ability to aerw his pariah. 
In tact, it be is to be a good 
blsmnd and parent, the dellard9 
of his f..Uly should interfere 
with his NJl'k. In the em, 
the 01urch and ~
NJUld suffer traa the part-
time priesth::iod. 
• LCH'.RDl3 mg STANllAmlS 
• If catholic parishicners 
t:Iu!ly Nlllted priests to be 
like a.1n.isters in other fai thll, 
catholics NJUld let it be 
lax:Ml. ait ll08t catholics are 
silent about marriage for 
priests because they "'8llt and 
mcpect m traa their prt..t.8. 
catholica .nt a prieet: to be 
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9aDe00e special I eamecne they 
can trust I 9CJlleCl'le Nx> by his 
~le guides and inspires 
them. 
N:luld the ex;aaples aet by 
married priests inspire Cath-
olics? tl'lfortunately not. A 
married priest t«:IUld be a 
leader Nx> announces that he 
c::anrX>t devote himelf to God, 
that he 1a ally pa..-tia.lly 
coamitted to his special job. 
It Ne allow priests to aarry, 
Ne -v get lllOl'e priests, but 
Ne will also get priests Nx> 
are less devoted. J'Ust • the 
air l.inee and hosp! ta1 toDJ.ld not 
lower their standards to 
attract lllOl'e pilots and doct-
ors, the ChJrch cannot laer 
its starmrds to attract more 
priests. 
11le 01ui-ch and its fol-
lowers have very little to 
gain and very mlCh to looae if 
priests are allowlld to mrry. 
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Editorial Supporting Open Admissions Policies 
Salle recent l"\lllblings out of 
Sprirqf ield are can1ng traa 
educatic:n experts ""1o Mint 
reform at the State Higher 
!ducatic:n Board, the office 
that mk:es policy far Illinois' 
13 publicly fumed univer-
si ties. Al tlx:Jugh few agree en 
how to solve the problems or 
tohlc:h problems are B:JSt blpor-
tant, experts and interested 
spectators have Dlldl to say 
ab:Jut the public universities. 
Por instance, critics say that 
the budget for state univer-
ai ties is either too high or 
not high tn:JUgh. Experts say 
the dearw and presidents haw 
either too mch power or not 
enough pcwer. Tax ~ say 
that too mrrt c::ioorses are 
offered or not enough are 
offered. 
'ftlrough this noise 11111! 
heard a CX111plaint that caught 
our attentic:n. Por a'1f!!r a 
century the State Higher 
Bducatien Board had a aiasien -
- to provide high quality and 
lCN c:oat educ:atien to the 
people of Illinois. lhe Beard 
shcAlld be comer:ded for their 
efforts. Illinois universi-
ties are amaig the beat in the 
natioo and provide a first 
class educatien for Illinois 
residents. Our state univer-
sities have also made higher 
educatien affordable. Even 
tlx:Jugh students and their 
t-..ilies usually save and 
borrow to pay for college, tax 
S\lR)Ort t'rca all Illinois 
residents helps keep the coat 
dacl. 
~ the State !ducatioo 
Bee.rd has failed is in i ta 
adnissioos policy. OOOer the 
current "selective admissiaw" 
policy, acceptance into a 
state lmiversity is based en 
blO criteria: a high school 
diplaa. and the potential for 
success in college. "Poten-
tial" is usually based on 
success or failure in the 
past. Qtly N'len high ech:x>l 
grades and stan:Sard test scores 
are abo'Je sane a1n1- will 
the doors to the state univers-
ities open. M.:lat of Illinois' 
high school students easily 
meet the lllin1lua standards, 
bit acme do not. OOOer selec-
tive aiiaissicns, acceptance 
into Illinois universities 
remains a privilege that not 
all Illinois residents share. 
Now the trad1 tioo ot 
selective a:Dissicns into 
state fumed universitiea is 
being challenged bo/ Ma/ 
educ:atien experts 1n Spr~ 
field. 'ftle'y reo::men:! that 
the Board replace the selective 
ain1ssien policy with an •open 
achissicns" pllicy. tJrD!r open 
achissicns, past grades and 
teat ecore wru.1d be ignored. 
Acceptance into Illinois' 
state universities wculd 
require c:nly a high ech:x>l 
diplaa and the desire to 
leam. 
1he challenges to selec-
tive a:kiasions are sillple. A 
university that is blilt and 
mainta..1.ned w1 th public rrll!!'f 
shcAlld be open to the plblic. 
Each persc:n's tax dollars help 
su;p:::irt the schools. In 
return for this tax ~. 
ea.ch persc:n shcAlld have tbe 
right to atterd. By closing 
the doors of the university we 
do blO th1rgs. We deny people 
the right to use SC111ething that 
they help pay for. Arn, we 
send a r s ; "911! to people that 
tohlle their 1ltCDI!!!'/ is good 
enough to go to the univer-
si ties, they are not. 
Selective adlllissicns is 
alao challenged becauae it'• an 
lmfair blrdm on lClf 1ncme 
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ta.ilies. Tax payere traa all 
1nocae levels - high, aiddle, 
and low - help 8\JAXll'"t the 
state schools. !kit, st\Dents 
traa the low 1nccme families 
are 8'hitted into state sch:lols 
tar less often, usually because 
they came traa the N:ll"Bt 
plblic high echools and suf-
fered the lowest test scores. 
Ne believe that the education 
system that failed thell in the 
past should not igoore their 
dreeas to enter college in the 
future. With private un.1ver-
sit1• rema.1n1ng too expemive, 
the plblicly fumed miver-
sit1ea are tho a'lly }qie for 
law 1noome students. 
cpn.1ng the cblre to all 
high 8Chool graduates does not 
mearl that unqualified students 
will remain enrolled tilmi they 
are failing. 1he door that 
ea. the NlY into the un.1ver-
si ty -t be uaed with a door 
that shae the .ay out. llo 
one benefits fraa clasm:'OC.JIS 
that are ouercrowded, faculty 
that are OYenl:lrla!d, ..S 
cl.aamlte that slow the pace 
of l8Ei119Cn11. 
there will be growing 
pains with open ada1•ims, 
bit with prqm" control m'ld an 
out door that 9ldnga as easily 
as an in door, the paiDI will 
be replaces w1 th gains. 1ht 
issue of open ai:in.iasiaw is an 
emot1ooal aie. Its foes 
believe in their hearts that 
educaticn will suffer if 
ewryale is offered it. Its 
friends, however, believe that 
w1 th educatim, like heal th, 
ewryale benefits if ~
has it. 
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Editorial Opposing Open Admissions Policies 
OSIH3 'nm STATE UNIVERSITIES 
WISELY 
Sale recent rumblings out ot 
Springfield are o::aing from 
education experts NX> tent 
refona at the State Higher 
l!'ducation Board, the office 
that mla!s p::>licy for Illinois' 
13 plblicly fumed univer-
si ties. Al thcagh few agree ai 
hDf to solve the problems or 
lllhich problems are ll:l9t lllport-
ant. experta and interested 
spectators have DlCh to eay 
abJut the plblic universities. 
Par imt.anoe, critics _., that 
the bldget for state univer-
si ties is either too high or 
not high enough. Experts .ay 
the deans and presidents hive 
either too mxh pc::N!l' or net 
eroa;h power. Tax pa~ say 
that too l8f'I'f courses are 
ottered or not enoogh are 
offered. 
1hroogh th.is noise • 
heard a cc:ap.laint that caught 
cur attentiai. Par CNe1" a 
oentmy the State Higher 
Pducaticn Board had a aiesicn -
- to provide high quality and 
lCllf ccat educaticn to the 
people of Illinois. 'ftlf! Board 
eb:Juld be caaasded for their 
efforts. Illinois universi-
ties are aaaig the best in the 
natioo and provide a first 
c1- educaticn for Illinois 
rmidents. OUr state univer-
•ities have also mde higher 
eclJcaticn affordable. Everl 
thcugh st'ldents and their 
families usually save and 
borrow to pay for college, tax 
sqiport traa all Illinois 
residents helps keep the coat 
dacl. 
Same experts are ~inJ, 
haever, that the State Higher 
Fducation Board has failed an 
illportant part of this aissim. 
'ftlf! ccaplaint centers on the 
Board's adaiasicns p::>Ucy. 
Under the current "selective 
achissicns" p::>licy. acceptance 
into a state university is 
based on blo criteria: a high 
sc:b:X>l dipl.cma. and the p::>ten-
tial for sucoeea in college. 
"Potential" for college is 
usually baaed en a history of 
past succeee in high ec:bool. 
~ high echcol grades and 
standard test acares are alxJvie 
sane llUniam, the doors to the 
state universities open. Nll!!!l 
high sc:b:X>l grades and tests 
scores are lCllf. the doors to 
state universities remain 
Closed. M:8t of IllinoJa I 
high school stlm!nts -ily 
meet the •jnf•• 8tandards, 
bit sane do not. thiel' eelee-
tive ada.iasicns, acxq;>tar.oe 
into Illinois universities 
1"'elDaJne a privilege that 
Illinois residents need to 
eam. 
!bf the trad..iticn of 
selective adaiasia. into 
state furded universities is 
being challeriged b1J a few 
educaticn exp:rt:a. ~ 
rec:oamen:! that the Board 
replace the selective adm1ssicn 
p::>licy with an "open adl.1.s-
sicns" policy. O'der open 
ada.iasicns, ~ grades and 
test 9C01"e NCul.d be ignored. 
Accepta11ce into Illinois 1 
state 9Chools tclUld require 
a'lly the wish to atterxl, bit 
net the history of success or 
the p::>tential to graduate. 
Supporters of open a&U.s-
s icns reason that taxpayers 
have earned the right to a 
college education b1J blilding 
and maintaining state univer-
si ties with their tax dollars. 
Since their tax dollars help 
pay for it, they sb:Wd get to 
use it. True, bit a'lly to a 
p::>int. av the same lcgic. 
paying ta>Cl!!!8 to the federal 
govennent \olCUld entitle the 
1llelll thy to get food st.p. and 
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MCU.ld entitle average ci ti.ze!w 
adventures a\ the space smt-
ue. Tax dollars do not give 
m carte bl.anche to all state 
service. 
At 9C1m! p:>int, the state 
has to be realistic. 'Ihe 
state can afford - tut just 
barely - to educate all of 
its residents through high 
school. 'Ihe cost of a college 
educ:aticn is ao high and 1n 
such short SUR>lY that the 
state 111.lSt use its colleges 
wisely. 
Open aa.issiaw .1e a ...ell 
inten:Sed. tut UBd.ae use of 
public universities. 'Ihe 
direct resu.l t of open adlll.1s-
sia'1119 MCUld be owrcrc:Jtded 
clwrocms an:S OYen«Jtbd 
tacul ty. 'Ihe best students 
MCUld f .1m OOUl'9e8 unchal-
lenging and uninspiring because 
lectures NJUJ.d be elCMed dcNl 
bl/ or brought dcNl to leas 
able stuient:a. In all likeli-
hood, open adlrlasiaw MOUld 
Ml!!8bn the univeraitl•. If 
the state Higher !duc:aticz 
Beard Wl!llnts to sooceed 1n the 
aiasicn of prov1d1ng high 
qm..11 ty. low cost e:!uc:atiCX\ to · 
the peq>le of Illinoie, it 
should stay with the &elective 
.,_1asiaw p:>licy that mde 
Illinois' 13 state universities 
~ the best 1n the ocuntry. 
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Editorial Supporing Mandatory Drug Testing 
tllil!!ll the (X'lllD1•icners Of 
both the National Baseball 
League and the Rational Poot-
ba.11 League first annoonced 
that all players ..t regularly 
un1ergo mamatory tests to 
detect illegal drug use. mny 
players - and llW:lBt private 
eq;>layees - Ne1"e caught 
without a solid legal defense 
and with few good argtm!llta. 
A federal coort told 
players and ~
ellplayees they da\ It have the 
legal defenses of the cxnatit-
ution that protect our privacy 
frail unreasc:mble eearch aid 
seizure "bof the gouerTlll!l'lt." 
But. Nlell private c:ampaniee 
are do1ng the.searc:hing, 
emiplayees do not have the 
ccnsti tution m their te.. 
At pz e 11 mt. ClClll:eJUe8 are 
w1nn.ing the CO'ltest CNer 
mndatory drug tests, espec-
ially far jobs that imiolw 
the safety of other people. 
"n"9 court rulinga do not just 
awly to c::M!i-deYeloped foot-
ball players. Par instance. 
the courts have 1ncltded truck 
drivers. CXOJt:Nctim N01icera. 
factory NtJrkoeH. and others as 
open for drug testing. 
'l1le silence of the o:mst-
i tution takes ~ the mjor 
defenge of private Nll"kers. 
niere are other reascns. 
~. to favor drug test1ng. 
In fact. we think the case for 
mardatcrt tests in safety-
sensitive jobs is strmg. 
O(p:ine!lts of mrdatory tests 
Eke sane argunents that 
s~ly den' t stand up. 
cwerients argue that drug 
tests are not accurate aid that 
Err/ inoocent people will be 
falsely accused of drug use. 
After all • JD.istalces do higlen. 
lltlle this fear had aome 
grcund.1ng in the past. it has 
little grounding today. 
Recently the federal courts 
began rul1ng that c:aipn.1es 
must use drug tests with great 
care. Great care 1nclu:tea 
using a aeccnd, lllOl'e accurate 
test for anyooe that test 
positive for drug use. If the 
eq>layee does not test positive 
a'l the aeccnd test. he 1.e in 
the clear. If a secx::n! test 
is not used the ccapmy can 
expect to be dragged to coort 
by employees and can expect to 
loose. By ensuring that no 
peq>le are wraigly acc'lsed of· 
drug use, the a1"'gl.mlE!nt aboot 
test accuracy is Dl1"I! fear · 
than fact. 
l!'.lllplayees al&o argue that 
..roatcrt testing, "'1.ile not 
technic:ally illegal. alght to 
t:e illegal. Ne disagree. In 
fact. te see clear reascn to 
beliew that CCllPIJlies are 
morally obligated to use 
mndatary tests. In the 
1930'• the Allerican labor 
KM!llll!llt helped the COJntly 
recognize that "<lfllY e11player 
must m.intain a Nlrkplace free 
fraa hazards that are lilmly to 
c:auae death and serious injuly. 
In the 1980'• Ni! -t recognlle 
the hazards of drugs in the 
N:>rkplac:e. Statistics frca the 
American Medical Associatim 
MUn that 1 out of 20 ~ 
workers has a drug problem. 
and 1 of 10 has an alcx::h>l 
problem. Many of these P.l"Ob-
leins are left at heme. bit 
sane cxae to N:nit. In safety-
~itive jobs, cme perscn 1s 
drug problem can cost another 
persc:&'l his life. If testiJ9 
helps identify people tillO are 
us1ng dnigs. ar if it helps 
prevents employees frall tlying 
dnigs. then the caipany DJSt 
use test1ng to protect .inrxx::ent 
peq>le. 
Pina.ll y. cg>alll!!lts of 
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mndatory testing argue that 
our private life is a private 
matter and is no business of 
our employer. We 1'CJUld agree, 
but a\ly if what Ne do at hcme 
does not affect Nlilt Me do at 
1Cll'k. SID:lk1ng mrijuana on 
Sat\n'day should not c:cn:::em 
our bosses if it does not 
affect us m tblday. Using 
ooc:a1ne in the evenir9 is 
private if it leaves us clear 
a1JDed in the morning. 'lbese 
are big "if•" thJu;h, am with 
drug abuse, private life and 
NJrk life do overlap. All too 
often, drugs at heme bec:me 
abaenteeiaa and seriam acci-
dents at tcn1t. ~ayers haw 
been forced to learn this 
lesscm, and are forced to do 
acmeth1ng aboot 1 t. 
llD CGllpllly reliahee the 
idea of regular drug testing. 
Testing 1a experlSiYe and 
urvip1 J v . But, it a c:mpauy 
feels that drug abuse poaea a 
seriam and reel threat to 
other warb:!lw, tb9 CXlllllpm1y hM 
the right - if not the obliga-
tion - to take this \V'lpq'' l ar 
step. Sc:metilles the public 
interest -t Neigh heavier 
than private interests. tllerl 
it CC9!l8 to pt'Otecting imxx:ent 
~le, CCllpmiee llhculd be 
allONed to conduct mndatary 
drug testing. 
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Editorial Opposing Mandatory Drug Testing 
"ill!ll the ccmn.issiooers of 
both the Natiaw.l Basetall 
League and the Hatiaal Poot-
l:all League first anromced 
that all players 11.lSt regularly 
a00ergo mamatory tests to 
detect illegal drug use, sany 
players - and most private 
e11ployees - Nel'e caught 
wi thcut an 1Jllportaa1t legal 
defense bit with many valid 
complaints. 
A federal court told 
players ard ncrHJCYe?'.l"lt 
C!llployees they don't have the 
legal defenses of the cxnrtit-
utlon that protect our privacy 
trc:a unreasooable search and 
aeizure "by the gcM!?'DDl!!nt.• 
art, ..tlll!!l pri"Arte ~
are do1ng the eearching, 
e11ployees do mt haw the 
c:awtitution on their tam. At 
present, c:capmUee are winUng 
the ccntest CJUll!t1" mndatory drug 
tests, especially for jobs 
that !nYolvie the safety of 
other people. 1he court 
rulinga do rx>t just apply to 
CM!r'-develqed football play-
ers. For instan::e, the c:curts 
have incl\D!d tNck drivers, 
cx:nrt:ructim 1llOrlcers, factory 
N:l?"lcel:'S, and others as open 
terr drug test1ng. 
1he silence of the ccnrt-
itutiai takes~ m.ly ale 
defense of private employees. 
'l'here are other reascns, 
?x:wever. to cwcse drug test-
!Jl1. In fact' N!! th1nlt the 
case against mamatory tests 
in safety-sens! ti ve jobs is 
still very straq because 
supporters of mrnatory tests 
Eke 9CIDe argunents that silllply 
dcn't stand up. 
SURx>rters argue that 
drug tests are accurate. 1he 
Ekers of these tests say 
their tests mJce mly 3 errors 
far each 100 employees. Nice 
resul ta. But, N1en the tests 
are re--chec:ked b'{ less profit-
oriented scientists the results 
are awa.Ilil'qly bad. 1he 
An!rican Medical Asaociatim 
found that drug tests mJce rx>t 
3' but 2!5 aistalcea in 100. 
Bad erDJgh being around other 
people tolx> are Slldc.1ng mariju-
ana my cause you to test 
positive far drug use, these 
"state-of-~ tests" 
confuse cold medicines w1 th 
aqibetaninee, oriental teas 
with marijuana, am the PW'/ 
seeds on ycur bagel with opiaa 
and heroine. Twenty-five 
a1stakes in 100 Iepl ! a ents 25 
people tiiX> aight loaae their 
jobs, their futura, and their 
repitatic:ma bec:au8e they are 
gull ty of nothing m tmn 
worldng for • c:cmpany that 
requires drug tests. 
Colllpan.ies UB1ng these 
tests alao argue that ll!lndatory 
testing falls w1 th the bound-
aries of the law. Ne agree. 
'Dle9e tests are tec:hn.1cally 
legal , but M9 also feel they 
are a gross distartim of the 
legal systea. our legal 
system leans in hM:ir of 
innocence Mll!re 9CIMtiw a 
gull ty per8al gees tree to 
ensure that innocent people 
are never caNicted. DNg 
testing leans in the qp:si te 
directim and favors gull t -
mny imcx::ent people get fired 
to ensure that the few pe6ple 
guilty of using drugs are 
caught. 'fttls notim of just-
ice, we feel, is hard to 
defend. 
Finally, defE!llders of 
lllSB3atory tests argue that 
c:x:apmiea have the right to 
protect their CUipiillY. their 
employees, and their custanere 
fraa drug ab.lSe. Ro argmeit, 
here. Drugs dcn't belcn;1 in 
the tclriq>lace. th!!ll drl.1gl!I are 
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used, productivity stulbles, 
proti ta fall, and insurance 
premi1- get as high as the 
rrumber of accidents. But, 
there are better, 9:lre hnane 
NBy8 to CCl'ltrol drug al:AJl!le 
than forcing 1«lrlcel• to provide 
urine smples. Sohen dl'UIJll 
becale a problem there are 
clear signs - regular tardi-
ness, absentee.ism, job impair-
ment, poor c:orduct and ~ 
tiooal troubles. If a omc:auy 
educates aupervi.aors and co-
HOl'kera alxlut theae signs 
there 1s no need for expensive 
am inaccurate tests. Drug 
abl&e 1s a probl• that .1a 
best sp:>tted am treated ~ 
people. not ~ test t'ubes and 
.labratcry b!&ts. 
Cb! issue Ne feel that 
cxmpan.1es too often try to 
a1niaJ.3e is aft ellp}ayee I 8 
privacy. Just because the 
ocnrti tutiai does not preYent 
CQl" boaeea trca erxx::ipinlJ into 
CQl" private lives doesn't ..ii 
that thley ah:Wd be anoq>ing. 
If - and this 1a a big •if• -
- ,,._t Ne do at tale has no 
effect ai "'8t • do at lll:lrit, 
it should be toespected -
private. If te decide to '8e 
marijuana cm Saturmy night 11e 
8hculd anaer to the police, 
not to our bosses. It 1a rxne 
of their t:usinem, and artside 
of their righta. fotlndatcry 
drug testing ooght to be bamed. 
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APPENDIX D: 
PERSONALITY SCALES USED IN THE STUDY 
Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale 
MCSD 
Listed below are a number of statements concerning personal attitudes 
and traits. Read each item and decide whether the statement is true 
or false as it pertains to you personally. Then circle "T" if the 
statement is true for you, and "F" if the statement if false for you. 
l) T F Before voting I thoroughly investigate the qual-
ifications of all the candidates. 
2) T F I never hesitate to go out of may way to help 
someone in trouble. 
3) T F It is sometimes hard for me to go on with my work 
if I am not encouraged. 
4) ·T F I have never intensely disliked anyone. 
5) T F On occasion I have doubts about my ability to 
succeed in life. 
6) T F I sometimes feel resentful when I don't get my way. 
7) T F I am always careful about my manner of dress. 
8) T F My table manners at home are as good as when I eat 
out in a restaurant. 
( 9) T F If I could get into a movie without paying and be 
sure I was not seen, I would probably do it. 
(10) T F On a few occasions, I have given up doing something 
because I thought too little of my ability. 
(11) T F I like to gossip at times. 
(12) T F There have been times when I felt like rebelling 
against people in authority even though I knew they 
were right. 
(13) T F No matter who I'm talking to, I'm always a good 
listener. 
(14) T F I can remember "playing sick" to get out of 
something. 
(15) T F There have been occasions when I took advantage of 
someone. 
(16) T F 
(17) T F 
I'm always willing to admit it when I make a 
mistake. 



































I don't find it particularly difficult to get along 
with loud mouthed, obnoxious people. 
I sometimes try to get even, rather than forgive 
and forget. 
When I don't know something, I don't at all mind 
admitting it. 
I am always courteous, even to people who are 
disagreeable. 
At times I have really insisted on having things my 
own way. 
There have been occasions when I felt like smashing 
things. 
I would never think of letting someone else be 
punished for my wrongdoings. 
I never resent being asked to return a favor. 
I have never been irked when people expressed ideas 
very different from my own. 
I never make a long trip without checking the 
safety of my car. 
There have been times when I was quite jealous of 
the good fortune of others. 
I have almost never felt the urge to tell someone 
off. 
I am sometimes irritated by people who ask favors 
of me. 
I have never felt that I was punished without 
cause. 
I sometimes think when people have a misfortune 
they only got what they deserved. 
I have never deliberately said something that hurt 
someone's feelings. 
Feelings of Inadequacy Scale 
FII 
Please answer each of the following questions by circling the 
answer that best describes you. 
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================================================================= 
1. How often do you have the feeling 
that there is nothing you can do 
well? 
2. When you have to talk in front 
of a class or group of people 
your own age, how often do you 
feel afraid or worried. 
3. How often do you worry about 
whether other people like to 
be with you? 
4. How often do you feel self-
conscious? 
5. How often are you troubled with 
shyness? 
6. How often do you feel that you 
handle yourself well at social 
gatherings? 
7. How often do you have the feel-
ing that you can do everything 
well? 
8. When you talk in front of a 
class or group of people your 
own age, how often are you 







































4=0nce in a Great While 
S=Practically Never 
9. How often do you feel comfort-
able when starting a conversa-
tion with people who you don't 
know? 
10. How often do you feel that you 
are a successful person? 
11. How often do you feel inferior 
to most of the people you know? 
12. How often have you felt that 
you are a worthless individual? 
13. How much do you worry about how 
well you get along with other 
people? 
14. How often have you felt that 
you dislike yourself? 
15. How often have you felt so 
discouraged with yourself that 
you wondered whether anything 
is worthwhile? 
16. How often do you feel that you 
are a success at the things 
that you do? 
17. How often have you felt that 
you will be a success in your 












































4=0nce in a Great While 
S=Practically Never 
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18. How often have you felt sure of 
yourself when among strangers? 
19. How often do you feel that some 
day people you know will look 
up to you and respect you? 
20. In general, how often have you 














4=0nce in a Great While 
S=Practically Never 
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Speilberger Trait Anxiety Scale 
SELF-EVALUATION QUESTIONNAIRE 
STAJF-Y·I 
DIRECTIONS: A number of statements which people have used to 
describe themselves are given below. Read each statement and then 
blacken in the appropriate circle to the right of the statement to in-
dicate how you generally feel. There are no right or wrong answers. Do 
noc spend too much time on any one statement but give the answer 
which seems to describe how you generally feel. 
21. I feel pleasant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . © @ @ © 
22. I feel nervous and restless <D © 
25. I feel satisfied with myself <D @ © 
24. I wish I could be as happy as others seem to be . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <D @ ()) © 
25. I feel like a failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <D @ @ © 
26. I feel rested . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <D @ @ © 
27. I am "calm, cool, and collected" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <D @ @ © 
28. I feel that difficulties are piling up so that I cannot overcome them <D @ @ © 
29. I worry too much over something that really doesn't matter . . . . . . <D @ @ © 
50. I am happy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <D @ @ © 
51. I have disturb.ing though1s .. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . <D @ @ @ 
52. I lack self-confidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <D @ <D © 
55. I feel secure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <D @ @ © 
54. I make decisions easily . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <D @ @ © 
55. 1 feel inadequate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . © @ @ © 
'6. I am content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . © @ @ © 
57. Some unimportant 1hought runs through my mind and bothers me © @ @ © 
58. I take disappointments so keenly that I can't put them out of my 
mind ...................... · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · <D @ @ @ 
59. I am a steady person ............................ ·'· . . . . . . . . . . . <D @ @ © 
40. I ge1 in a s1a1e of tension or turmoil as I think over my recent concerns 





We would like you to read the following statements and then 
indicate how strongly you agree or disagree each. There are no 
"correct" responses to these statements, only those responses that 
best describe you and your personal feelings. 
You can indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with each 
statement by using the following scale. Please circle the one 
number that best describes you and your personal feelings. 
-4 Very Strong Disagreement 
-3 = Strong Disagreement 
-2 Moderate Disagreement 
-1 Slight Disagreement 
o = Neither Disagreement or Agreement 
+1 Slight Agreement 
+2 Moderate Agreement 
+3 = strong Agreement 
+4 Very Strong Agreement 
================================================================== 
1) I really enjoy a task that -4 -3 -2 -1 o +1 +2 +3 +4 
involves coming up with new 
solutions to problems. 
2) Learning new ways to think -4 -3 -2 -1 O +1 +2 +3 +4 
doesn't excite me very much. 
3) The idea of relying on thought -4 -3 -2 -1 O +1 +2 +3 +4 
to make my way to the top does 
not appeal to me. 
4) The idea of thinking abstractly -4 -3 -2 -1 O +l +2 +3 +4 
is not appealing to me. · 
5) I only think as hard as I have -4 -3 -2 -1 O +1 +2 +3 +4 
to. 
6) I like tasks that require little -4 -3 -2 -1 O +1 +2 +3 +4 
thought once I've learned them. 
7) I prefer to think about small, -4 -3 -2 -1 O +1 +2 +3 +4 
daily projects to long-term ones. 
8) I would rather do something that -4 -3 -2 -1 o +1 +2 +3 +4 
requires little thought than some-
thing that is sure to challenge 
my thinking abilities. 
9) I find little satisfaction in -4 -3 -2 -1 O +1 +2 +3 +4 




-4 = Very Strong Disagreement 
-3 = Strong Disagreement 
-2 = Moderate Disagreement 
-1 Slight Disagreement 
0 = Neither Disagreement or Agreement 
+l = Slight Agreement 
+2 = Moderate Agreement 
+3 = Strong Agreement 
+4 = Very Strong Agreement 
================================================================== 
10) I don't like to have the respon-
sibility of handling a situation 
that requires a lot of thinking. 
11) I feel relief rather than satis-
faction after completing a task 
that required a lot of mental 
effort. 
12) Thinking is not my idea of fun. 
13) I try to anticipate and avoid 
situations where there is a 
likely chance I will have to 
think about something in depth. 
14) I prefer my life to be filled 
with puzzles that I must solve. 
15) I would prefer complex to simple 
problems. 
16) It's enough for me that some-
thing gets the job done, I don't 
care how or why it works. 
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 +l +2 +3 +4 
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 +l +2 +3 +4 
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 +l +2 +3 +4 
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 +l +2 +3 +4 
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 +l +2 +3 +4 
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 +l +2 +3 +4 
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 +l +2 +3 +4 
APPENDIX E: 
PAPER-AND-PENCIL 
MEASURES OF PERSUASIBILITY 
P-Scale 
No doubt, there are many times in a day that people try to 
convince you of something. People you live with may suggest that a 
relative is dishonest because of something he or she did. After 
seeing a movie together, you and a friend may disagree about the 
movie, and that friend then tries to point out something about the 
movie that you had not considered. You may have read a newspaper or 
magazine article that concluded some government policy ought to be 
changed, or that one political candidate is better qualified than 
another candidate. Even authors of text books may try to convince 
you which theories are best. 
For the next few minutes we would like you to think about three 
occasions in the last few days when a someone tried to influence ~ 
of your opinions -- important or unimportant. For example, think 
about some conversations you have had recently when you mildly or 
sharply disagreed with another person. Think about some articles in 
the papers or some theories in your texts you recently read. Think 
about any occasions when someone tried to persuade you. 
IN THE SPACES BELOW, PLEASE WRITE A SHORT SENTENCE OR TWO TO DESCRIBE 




*************PLEASE WAIT FOR FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS************* 
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With these occasions in mind, we would like you to indicate how 
accurately a list of statements describes how you feel, in general, 
whenever someone tries to persuade you. We have included many 
different statements to cover the many feelings you might have when 
someone tries to persuade you. You may find that some of these 
statements describe how you feel very accurately, some only describe 
you somewhat accurately, and some do not give an accurate description 
of your feelings at all. Whether these statements describe you or 
not, you can be sure that many people feel the same as you. 
You can indicate how accurately each statement describes you by 
using the following scale: 
IN GENERAL, THIS STATEMENT DESCRIBES ME •.. 
l=VERY Accurately 
2=FAIRLY Accurately 
3=HARD TO SAY 
4=FAIRLY Inaccurately 
5=VERY Inaccurately 
Please draw a circle around the one number that best describes how 
accurately each statement describes you. 
01. Usually I've wanted to do the opposite 
of what people try to convince me to 
do. 
In general, this statement describes me: 
02. I sometimes do not trust my own judgment. 
In general, this statement describes me: 
03. When people try to change my mind, I 
try hard to prevent them from accomp-
1 i shing it. 
In general, this statement describes me: 
04. After listening to someone, it is easy 
for me to see things "in a new light." 
In general, this statement describes me: 
05. It is hard for me to see things from 
someone else's point of view when they 
are trying to convince me of something. 
In general, this statement describes me: 
06. Rather than listening while people are 
talking to me, I am usually thinking of 
things to rebut what they are saying. 
In general, this statement describes me: 
07. When listening to someone, I usually 
realize that there can be more than one 
correct opinion. 


































3=Hard To Say 
4=Fairly Inaccurately 
5=Very Inaccurately 
-----------------------------------------------------~-----------08. I am often surprised at how convincing 
people can be. 
In general, this statement describes me: 
09. It is ~ important that people see 
my point of view than it is for me to 
see things from their point of view. 
In general, this statement describes me: 
l=Very Accurately 
2=Fairly Accurately 





3=Hard To Say 
4=Fairly Inaccurately 
5=Very Inaccurately 
10. Usually I've felt uncomfortable when 
people try to convince me of their ideas. 
In general, this statement describes me: 
11. People often win me over to their point 
of view. 
In general, this statement describes me: 
12. During discussions with people, I hold 
onto my opinions more strongly than 
most other people. 
In general, this statement describes me: 
13. I usually "give in" to people because I 
eventually realize they are right. 
In general, this statement describes me: 
14. In most cases, changing my opinions is 
better than hanging on to old opinions. 
























3=Hard To Say 
4=Fairly IQaccurately 
5=Very Inaccurately 
-------~---------------------------------------------------------15. I usually hold onto my opinions even 
when other people hold the opposite 
opinions. 
In general, this statement describes me: 
16. I feel uncomfortable if someone convinces 
me to adopt a new opinion. 
In general, this statement describes me: 
17. It is important for me to share opinions 
that are compatible with the opinions of 
my friends. 
In general, this statement describes me: 
18. Changing my opinions makes me doubt my 
integrity. 
In general, this statement describes me: 
l=Very Accurately 
2=Fairly Accurately 















3=Hard To say 
4=Fairly Inaccurately 
5=Very Inaccurately 
19. I am usually uncomfortable when my 
opinions are at odds with the opinions 
of other people. 
In general, this statement describes me: 
20. Once I form an opinion, I frequently 
wonder if my decision was correct. 
In general, this statement describes me: 
21. I am a better listener than leader. 
In general, this statement describes me: 
22. Many times I am ~ convinced that my 
opinions are correct after someone tries 
to change my mind. 
In general, this statement describes me: 
23. I put more trust in my judgment than in 
the judgment of ~ people. 
In general, this statement describes me: 
24. I think that people who don't change 
their opinions are usually stubborn. 
In general, this statement describes me: 
25. Compared to most people, I'm an indep-
endent, free-thinker. 
In general, this statement describes me: 
26. I think people who hold onto their 
opinions are admirable. 
In general, this statement describes me: 
27. I believe it takes a strong person to 
admit that their own opinions are 
wrong. 












































3=Hard To say 
4=Fairly Inaccurately 
5=Very Inaccurately 
28. When someone is trying to convince me of 
something, I try hard to listen to what 
they are saying. 
In general, this statement describes me: 
29. My opinions are very important to me. 
In general, this statement describes me: 
30. When people try to convince me of things, 
they usually have good ideas. 
In general, this statement describes me: 
31. My opinions rarely change because they 
are rarely wrong. 
In general, this statement describes me: 
32. I get defensive when people try to 
change my opinions. 
In general, this statement describes me: 
33. I've found that I am usually correct if 
I trust my own judgment. 
In general, this statement describes me: 
34. I believe that changing your opinions 
is a sign of maturity. 
In general, this statement describes me: 
35. I think it is better to be open-minded 
than it is to be strong-willed 
In general, this statement describes me: 
36. When listening to someone, I often begin 
to rethink my position. 












































3=Hard To Say 
4=Fairly Inaccurately 
5=Very Inaccurately 
37. I usually feel confident about my 
beliefs. 
In general, this statement describes me: 
38. When listening to people, I usually learn 
that an issue in nQ.t as simple or as 
"black and white" as I first thought. 
In general, this statement describes me: 
39. My opinions usually turn out to be right. 
In general, this statement describes me: 
40. After listening to someone, it is easier 
for me to see things "in a new light" 
than it is for most other people. 
In general, this statement describes me: 
41. It is important for me to hold onto my 
opinions. 
In general, this statement describes me: 
42. In a discussion, I probably change my 
mind more easily than most people. 
In general, this statement describes me: 




















3=Hard To Say 
4=Fairly Inaccurately 
5=Very Inaccurately 
l=Very Accurately . 
2=Fairly Accurately 










3=Hard To Say 
4=Fairly Inaccurately 
In general, this statement describes me: 5=Very Inaccurately 
-----------------------------------------------------------------44. Many times my opinions may "bend but not 
break". 
In general, this statement describes me: 
45. I usually see if my opinions are reason-
able by listening to what other people 
are saying. 
In general, this statement describes ae: 
l=Very Accurately 
2=Fairly Accurately 





3=Hard To Say 
4=Fairly Inaccurately 
5=Very Inaccurately 
46. People think I am stubborn. 
In general, this statement describes me: 
47. I usually feel like I've improved myself 
if I form a new opinion, and get rid of 
an old one. 
In general, this statement describes me: 
48. I sometimes worry when my beliefs are 
different than the beliefs of most 
people. 
In general, this statement describes me: 
49. It bothers me to change my opinions. 
In general, this statement describes me: 
50. It is sometimes better to tr~st the 
judgment of Q.thgr people than to rely 
on my own feelings. 
In general, this statement describes me: 
51. In a discussion, I am more open-minded 
than most people. 
In general, this statement describes me: 
52. I think that people who change their 
opinions are usually weak. 
In general, this statement describes me: 
53. I almost always believe that my opinions 
are correct. 
In general, this statement describes me: 
54. I think people who hold onto their 
opinions have strong characters. 












































3=Hard To Say 
4=Fairly Inaccurately 
5=Very Inaccurately 
55. When I disagree with someone, I rarely 
change my mind because they are usually 
wrong. 
In general, this statement describes me: 
56. I usually listen to the opinions of 
people I like. 
In general, this statement describes me: 
57. I believe it takes a strong person to 
admit that someone else's opinions are 
right. 
In general, this statement describes me: 
58. I usually trust that my own opinions are 
right, even when people try to change my 
mind. 
In general, this statement describes me: 
59. In a discussion, I usually work hard 
to hold onto my beliefs. 
In general,· this statement describes me: 
60. I think that changing your opinions is 
a sign of open-mindedness. 
In general, this statement describes me: 
61, I am usually an assertive person. 
In general, this statement describes me: 
62. Changing my opinions is no big deal. 
In general, this statement describes me: 












































Phillips Persuasibility Inventory 
PPI 
on the following pages are 42 statements. The best answer to each 
statement is your personal opinion. We have tried to cover many 
opposing and different points of view. You may find yourself 
strongly agreeing with some of the statements, disagreeing just as 
strongly with some, and perhaps less certain about others. Whether 
you agree or disagree with any statement, you can be sure that many 
people feel the same as you do. 
Draw a circle around the number in the left margin preceding each 
statement according to how you agree or disagree with it. Please 
circle one nuinber for each statement. · 
6: I AGREE VERY MUCH 3: I DISAGREE A LITTLE 
5: I AGREE ON THE WHOLE 
4: I AGREE A LITTLE 
2: I DISAGREE ON THE WHOLE 
1: I DISAGREE VERY MUCH 
1) 6 5 4 3 2 1 
2) 6 5 4 3 2 1 
3) 6 5 4 3 2 1 
4) 6 5 4 3 2 1 
5) 6 5 4 3 2 1 
6) 6 5 4 3 2 1 
7) 6 5 4 3 2 1 
8) 6 5 4 3 2 1 
9) 6 5 4 3 2 1 
10) 6 5 4 3 2 1 
11) 6 5 4 3 2 1 
12) 6 5 4 3 2 1 
Most of the ideas which get printed nowadays 
aren't worth the paper they are printed on. 
I do what others expect of me. 
My blood boils whenever a person stubbornly 
refuses to admit he or she is wrong. 
There are two kinds of people in this world; 
those who are for the truth and those who are 
against the truth. 
I would like to see the inflation and energy 
problems solved soon. 
Once I start a task, I don't 1 ike to start 
another until I finish the first one. 
People just don't know what's good for them. 
I must justify my actions in the pursuit of 
my own interests. 
Of all the different philosophies which exist 
in this world, there is probably only one 
which is correct. 
Before any important job, I must know how 
long it will take. 
I would support a large city-income tax which 
placed a heavy burden on me. 
The highest fonn of government is a demo-
cracy, and the highest form of democracy is a 
goverrutent run by the JIOSt intelligent people 
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6: I AGREE VERY MUCH J: I DISAGREE A LITTLE 
5: I AGREE ON THE WHOLE 
4: I AGREE A LITTLE 
2: I DISAGREE ON THE WHOLE 
1: I DISAGREE VERY MUCH 
13) 654321 
14) 6 5 4 3 2 1 
15) 6 5 4 3 2 1 
16) 6 5 4 3 2 1 
17) 6 5 4 3 2 1 
18) 6 5 4 3 2 1 
19) 654321 
20) 6 5 4 3 2 1 
21) 6 5 4 3 2 1 
22) 6 5 4 3 2 1 
2J) 6 5 4 3 2 1 
24) 6 5 4 3 2 1 
25) 6 5 4 3 2 1 
26) 6 5 4 3 2 1 
27) 6 5 4 3 2 1 
28) 6 5 4 3 2 1 
29) 6 5 4 3 2 1 
The United States and Russia have just about 
nothing in common. 
I live by the rules and standards of society. 
In a problem-solving group it is always best 
to systematically attack the problem. 
I'd like it if I could find someone who would 
tell me how to solve my personal problems. 
Proper rest is necessary for good health. 
In this complicated world of ours the only 
way we can know what's going on is to rely on 
leaders or experts who can be trusted. 
A problem has little attraction for me if I 
don't think it has a solution. 
Reasons are needed to justify my feelings. 
People on their own are helpless and miser-
able creatures. 
I do not like to get started 
projects unless I feel assured 
project will be successful. 
in group 
that the 
Education is a waste of time for children; 
they should be free to do as they want. 
It's only when a person devotes himself to an 
ideal or cause that life becomes meaningful. 
In a decision-making situation in which there 
is not enough information to process the 
problem, I feel very uncomfortable. · 
I only feel free to express warm feelings to 
my friends. 
Most people just don't give a damn for others 
To compromise with our political opponents is 
dangerous because it usually leads to the 
betrayal of our own side. 
Moderation in most activities is not a 
perfect rule, but it's a good one. 
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6: I AGREE VERY MUCH 3: I DISAGREE A LITTLE 
5: I AGREE ON THE WHOLE 
4: I AGREE A LITTLE 
2: I DISAGREE ON THE WHOLE 
1: I DISAGREE VERY MUCH 
30) 6 5 4 3 2 1 
31) 6 5 4 3 2 1 
32) 6 5 4 3 2 1 
33) 6 5 4 3 2 1 
34) 6 5 4 3 2 1 
35) 6 5 4 3 2 1 
36) 6 5 4 3 2 1 
37) 654321 
38) 6 5 4 3 2 1 
39) 6 5 4 3 2 1 
40) 6 5 4 3 2 1 
41) 6 5 4 3 2 1 
42) 6 5 4 3 2 1 
I don't like to work on a problem unless 
there is a possibility of coming out with a 
clear-cut and unambiguous answer. 
It is often desirable to reserve judg111ent 
about what's going on until one has had the 
chance to hear the opinions of those one 
respects. 
I will continue to grow only by setting my 
sights on a high-level, socially approved 
goal. 
The present is all too full of unhap~iness. 
It is only the future that counts. 
Complex problems appeal to me only if I have 
a clear idea of the total scope of the 
problem. 
Highway speed limits should be raised to 100 
miles per hour, even if 10 times as many 
people get killed. 
In a discussion I often find it necessary to 
repeat myself several times to make sure I am 
being understood. 
While I don't like to admit this even to 
myself, my secret ambition is ~ become a 
great person like Einstein, Shakespeare, 
Beethoven, or Madam Curie, Eleanor Roosevelt, 
or Susan B. Anthony. 
People should always control their anger. 
A group meeting functions best with a 
definite agenda. 
Even though freedom of speech for all groups 
is a worthwhile goal, it is unfortunately 
necessary to restrict the freedom of certain 
political groups. 
It is better to be a dead hero than to be a 
live coward. 
The main thing in life is for a person to 
want to do something important. 
Janis & Field Persuasibility Questionnaire 
JFPQ 
Please answer the following questions 
in a way that best ~escribes you. 
======-=----------~~-~--~--~--~----~--~~~----~~----
1) How often do you change your 
opinion if you discover that 
most of the people you know do 
not share your point of view? 
2) When one of you friends wants 
to convince you of his point 
of view, does he usually have 
a hard time or an easy time? 
3) As compared with the average 
person your own age, how much 
are you usually influenced by 
the ideas expressed by your 
friends? 
4) As coapared with the average 
person your age, how strongly 
do you usually hang onto your 
own opinions at ti:aes when 
your friends are trying to 
get you to change your aind? 
5) How easy is it for your friends 
to get you to do what they want 
you to do? 
6) When other people criticize 
your ideas or object to your 
opinion, how often do you end 
up feeling that they are right 
and you are wrong? 
7) How often do you becoae uneasy 
when the opinion of one of your 
friends is different fro• your 
own on so:ae important topic? 
O= Less than 1 ti:ae in 5 
1= About 1 time out of 5 
2= About 2 times out of 5 
3= About 3 times out of 5 
4= About 4 times out of 5 
5= More than 4 times in 5 
O= An Extremely Hard time 
l= A Moderately Hard time 
2= A Slightly Hard ti:me 
3= A Slightly Easy time 
4= A Moderately Easy time 
5= An Extremely Easy time 
O= Very Infrequently 
l= Infrequently 
2= Somewhat Infrequently 
3= Somewhat Frequently 
4= Frequently 
5= Very Frequently 
O= Very Strongly 
l= Strongly 
2= Soaewhat Strongly 
3= Somewhat Mildly 
4= Mildly 
5= Very Mildly 
O= It's Very Difficult 
l= It's Difficult 
2= It's Somewhat Difficult 
3= It's Somewhat Easy 
4= It's Easy 
5= It's Very Easy 
O= Very Infrequent~y 
l= Infrequently 
2= Somewhat Infrequently 
3= Somewhat Frequently 
4= Frequently 
5= Very Frequently 
O= Very Infrequently 
l= Infrequently 
2= Somewhat Infrequently 
3= Somewhat Frequently 
4= Frequently 
5= Very Frequently 
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8) How often do you feel sure you 
know what is right or wrong 
about the ideas expressed by 
the people you know? 
O= Very Infrequently 
l= Infrequently 
2= Somewhat Infrequently 
J= Somewhat Frequently 
4= Frequently 
5= Very Frequently 
9) How regularly do you agree or disagree with the articles that 
you read in newspapers and magazines? 
1 I Agree with practically everything I read. 
2 I Agree with most of the things I read. 
J I Agree with about half and Disagree with about half. 
4 I Disagree with most of the things I read. 
5 I Disagree with practically everything I read. 
10) Nowadays when people listen to the radio or watch 'rV, they 
hear a great deal of advertising, publicity, and information 
that attempts to influence their opinions. When compared to 
the average person your own age, how •uch are your own· ideas 
influence by the things you hear on the radio or 'rV? 
1 I all much more influenced than the average person. 
2 I am somewhat more influenced. 
3 I a• slightly more influenced. 
4 I am influenced about as •uch as the average person. 
5 = I a• slightly less influenced. 
6 I am somewhat less influenced. 
7 I all •uch less influenced than the average person. 
11) Consider all the •agazine articles and newspaper col Wills 
presenting a specific point of view which you :aay have read 
during the past year. About how aany of the• 11a.y have 
influenced your opinions? 
1 Practically none of the•. 
2 Very few of the•. 
3 Some of the• . 
. 4 A fairly large nWl.ber 
5 Most of the•. 
6 = Practically all of the•. 
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